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This thesis examines Congressman and Senator Mike Mansfield's approach 
to the foreign policy of the United States in regard to Western Europe, 
particularly with respect to American forces stationed in Europe. 
Mansfield's views on foreign affairs grew out of his belief that the 
United States must act as a responsible world power, using its powers 
to help create a world order based on equanimity and consent of nations, 
not on interference and contrivance. Thus, after Mansfield was convinced 
that Western Europe had recovered from the devastation of World War Two, 
he devoted his attention to the creation of a world order which granted 
more responsibility to Western Europe. Mansfield was convinced that if 
Western Europe assumed a larger burden in world affairs and more of the 
responsibilities of securing peace,the world would be a better, safer 
place.
Ultimately, Mansfield measured the success or failure of U.S. foreign 
policy based upon Western Europe's role in world affairs. If Western 
Europe acted as a united force, the United States would avoid the bull 
in the china shop syndrome. Thus, Mansfield promoted U.S. policies 
which supported an integrated and independent Europe. Toward that end, 
he gently, and sometimes not so gently, pushed the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Nixon administrations to move in that direction.
The first part of this thesis examines the development of Mansfield's 
approach to U.S.-European relations; the second part explores 
Mansfield's response to the Berlin crises of the late 1950s and early 
1960s; and the third part outlines Mansfield's effort to lobby those 
in charge of foreign policy to make some fundamental changes in the 
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No, he did not solve all the problems, 
because often they were unsolvable.
The point is that he always tried—  
and hard— and the larger point is, we 
always knew it.
—  K. Ross Toole
INTRODUCTION
Even before winning Montana’s Western District Congressional seat 
in 1942, Mansfield, as a lecturer in history at the University of 
Montana, made a habit of meticulously studying and analyzing foreign 
affairs. He once wrote: "It has been said that the two great loves of
my life are the University and the study of foreign affairs. I readily 
acknowledge a lasting liaison with the first and a deep absorption in 
the second."^ From his "deep absorption" in foreign affairs, whether 
as a hobby, as a teacher, or as a politician, he developed, for his day, 
a unique approach to U.S. foreign policy. This thesis analyzes 
Mansfield’s approach to U.S. policy in Europe.
As a congressman, Mansfield met the challenges of the Cold War by 
effectively combining moralistic yearnings with the practical pursuit 
of national self-interest. Such an approach to foreign relations has 
made it impossible to categorize Mansfield’s statesmanship in white or 
black; it would be misleading to label Mansfield’s approach to foreign 
affairs simply as realpolitik, purely idealistic, partisan or 
isolationist. Mansfield would have had it no other way, for he believed 
labels and stereotypes impeded the success of a statesman. Rather, to 
Mansfield, a successful statesman and a successful foreign policy 
needed to be flexible. To ensure success in foreign affairs, he 
believed it necessary to have many options, to adapt policy to changing 
situations, and to search constantly for new solutions for old problems.
1
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As a result of this approach to foreign affairs, some have considered 
Mansfield a maverick, outside of the mainstream, and have regarded his 
approach potentially detrimental to the security of the United States.
On the other hand, others have argued that his real genius as a 
statesman lay in his maverick approach to foreign policy.
This thesis will stress the latter evaluation in its examination of 
Mansfieldfs approach to Western Europe and the United States' relations 
from 1946-1971. The task is complex due to the complexities of 
Mansfield’s approach to and his extensive involvement in issues of 
foreign policy. Mansfield's attitudes are best demonstrated by his 
approach to U.S.-West European relations in view of the Cold War 
because of its centrality to U.S. foreign policies.
Mansfield's approach to U.S.-West European relations will be 
divided into three parts. The first part encompasses Mansfield's views 
on the United States' methods to ensure both world peace and its own 
security in the postwar period from 1946-1951. Mansfield's views on 
the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, military assistance to Western 
Europe and the United Nations will be explored in order to demonstrate 
Mansfield's perspective on the creation of a postwar order and the 
shaping of the future. Particular emphasis will be placed on Mansfield's 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each program or institution 
and his warnings about the potential shortfalls of U.S. Cold War 
policies.
The second part will outline his questioning whether established 
Cold War policies did in fact guarantee world peace and security for
3
the long term. By narrowly focusing on Mansfield*s reaction to the 
East-West confrontation over Berlin from 1959 to 1962, it will show 
that Mansfield offered alternatives to American foreign policy in order 
to break the deadlock between East and West.
After Berlin, Mansfield continued to question whether the arms 
race, a large standing army (especially overseas), and a steady stream 
of military and economic aid to countries around the globe had provided 
for America*s security. He worried that it taxed the resources of the 
United States. Because of that concern, he questioned the extent to 
which these Cold War policies secured Western security for the long 
term.
The third part of this thesis will explore Mansfield's attempt to 
turn the Senate's attention to American foreign policy. Specifically, 
it will examine the background of, and the debate in the Senate over, 
Mansfield's attempt to legislate the withdrawal of 150,000 U.S. troops 
in Western Europe.
It should be noted that Senator Mike Mansfield held a number of 
important posts during his twenty-four years in the Senate. The most 
respected and important job he held was Senate Majority Leader. He 
also cherished his seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
While both positions gave him great influence on U.S. foreign policy, 
by no means did he have the power to formulate or to determine American 
foreign affairs. Indeed, Mansfield, conscious of the "advice and 
consent" clause in the Constitution, mindfully respected the executive 
branch's right to determine foreign policy. In fact, his whole career
4
is marked with advice and consent to five presidents. Never did he 
attempt to take control and actually formulate U.S. foreign policy.
This thesis will attempt to establish that Mansfield was a voice 
in the wilderness in regard to the direction of the foreign policy of 
the United States. Nevertheless, even against insurmountable forces, 
Mansfield worked unceasingly to infuse fairness into the foreign 
policy of the United States. He could not be satisfied with himself 
if he did not at least make the attempt.
CHAPTER ONE
THE FORMATION OF MIKE MANSFIELD1S APPROACH TO U.S.-WESTERN EUROPE
RELATIONS, 1946-1959
The enormity of the task before all of them, 
after the wars in Europe and Asia ended in 
19/i5, only slowly revealed itself. As it did 
so, it began to appear as just a bit less 
formidable than that described in the first 
chapter of Genesis.
—  Dean Acheson
Present at the Creation
Geography had been the United States* best ally during World War 
Two. The vast expanses of the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans had 
protected the United States from the physical destruction experienced 
in Europe and Asia. Emerging from the war with its industrial base 
stronger than any other country in the world, the United States occupied 
the position as the dominant world power. From its new status as the 
indisputable world power came many new responsibilities, of which the 
grandest responsibility was how to ensure peace and prosperity for all 
nations in the face of the destruction which World War Two had wrought 
on Europe and Asia.
Even Acheson*s hyperbole could not exaggerate the problem. In 
fact, Acheson had not completed the analogy in Present at the Creation; 
for as God created man in his image, the United States resolved to 
create the new world order in its own image. The model consisted of 
free trade with free markets and free men.
5
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It was a natural course, in part, because the creators believed
the economic competition of the 1920s and 1930s was partly responsible
for World War Two. Thus, the creators proposed that if economic
competition were replaced by interdependency and cooperation, peace
and prosperity would be secured. Moreover, American statesmen were
products of the American tradition of equal opportunity in foreign
trade and foreign investment. In 1767, American colonist Nathaniel
Ames advised his fellow colonists that "trade and commerce" were "as
necessary to a state as wings to a bird."^ President Truman said
"large volume of soundly based international trade" was essential "to
achieve prosperity for the United States, build a durable structure of
2world economy and attain our goal of world peace and security." From 
Ames to Truman, the simplistic notion of free trade as the natural 
pursuit of a nation had evolved into the notion that without free trade 
world peace and prosperity would be jeopardized.
Clearly, the U.S. stood to benefit economically from such a world 
order, but American statesmen pointed out those areas physically 
devastated by the war would equally benefit from democratic capitalism 
because the innate strengths of this world order stood on economic 
reciprocity. In such a system, trading nations would naturally agree 
to cooperate with each other in order to ensure that equilibrium in 
trade would be maintained. Thus, it would be impossible for one nation 
to dominate such a system. To guarantee that the system ran properly, 
however, international agencies were established, such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the
7
Export-Import Bank. The system, however, needed a push to get started,
and the United States gave it the needed push through the implementation
3of the Marshall Plan.
Representative Mike Mansfield wholly agreed with the goals of the 
Truman administrations foreign policy in the immediate postwar period.
In a speech in 1946 Mansfield reminded his audience that "the greatest 
damage to the free nations has been largely self-inflicted." He 
continued that two world wars had occurred because of "the disunity 
of the Western European regions." According to Mansfield, these wars
4"were attempted suicides on the part of Western Europe." The former 
history teacher pointed out that now the world was a more dangerouse 
place because of the invention of nuclear weapons. A third world war 
would definitely be the last war fought on the earth. He declared that 
Europe had twice eviscerated itself; it could not be allowed a third 
attempt. Thus, to Mansfield, American action to help Europe recover 
from World War Two needed little debate.
Mansfield also worried about an environment in Europe in which the 
communist party could make momentous gains by probing "among the 
charred and smoking ruins.""* He believed that such gains could once 
again engulf Europe in war. Both concerns led Mansfield to agree with 
the Truman administration*s decision to rescue Europe from economic 
privation.
The first distinct sign of Mansfield1s approach to the Cold War 
surfaced over the role of the United Nations in world affairs. Mansfield 
believed once the United Nations became a viable organization it would
8
supersede the United States1 role not only in European affairs, but 
also in world affairs. The Truman administration did not share this 
view. George Kennan, at the time head of the Folicy Planning staff 
and chiefly responsible for devising foreign policy in the Truman 
administration, let it be known that he considered the United Nations 
an illusion, having little significance on world affairs.^ Kennan 
specifically blamed the United Nations1 ineffectiveness on its slow 
parliamentary process and its lack of a police force to enforce its 
declaration. Kennan and the Truman administration considered the 
United Nations a paper tiger in a world which needed a real tiger.
The idea behind the United Nations— nations cooperating together 
to solve problems and maintain peace— captured Mansfield's imagination. 
He proposed to one audience that, through the United Nations, nationsg
could "eventually find the peace all mankind craves." On another
occasion, he said if the United Nations could establish credibility,
"this generation may yet be able to title its chapter in history, not
the 'Descent into Barbarism* but 'The Establishment of World Order.1"
Mansfield also proclaimed that the United Nations would eventually
administer "the financial needs of the world and . . . take the burden
9off the shoulders of the United States."
To gain a clearer understanding of Mansfield's foreign policy, his 
initial enthusiasm for the United Nations must not be lightly passed 
over, especially in the context of the Truman Doctrine. Mansfield 
found lamentable Truman's decision in March 1947 to send military aid 
to Greece and Turkey while bypassing the United Nations. He believed
9
the United Nations should have had an active role in solving the 
problems in Greece and Turkey.^
Ultimately the Korean War, and the United Nations’ role in the 
Korean War, diluted Mansfield’s hope that the United Nations could be 
the eventual guarantor of world peace. In fact, by the spring of 1952, 
Mansfield had lost hope that the United Nations could establish and 
maintain a world order. On February 2, 1952 he admitted that the United 
Nations had been ’’oversold" to the American people.^ Certainly he had 
had a part in overselling the United Nations to the American public but, 
because of his admiration for the idea behind the United Nations, 
Mansfield kept alive his hope for the United Nations as the institution 
to secure peace and prosperity.
At the same time Mansfield stressed the importance of the United
Nations as the ideal institution he recognized the fact that the threat
by the Soviet Union to the redevelopment of a liberal economic and
political order in Western Europe meant that the United States had to
take an active role in Western Europe’s redevelopment. Thus, Mansfield
eventually did support aid to Greece and Turkey because he believed:
"If we [the United States] reject this legislation we give notice to
the U.S.S.R. that we do not propose to do anything to stop or to
12interfere with its expansion policy." However, while Mansfield voted 
for the bill which granted military and economic aid to Greece and 
Turkey, he did so with hesitations. While he believed that if the 
United States refused to send aid to Greece and Turkey the communists 
might gain control, he also weighed the potential harmful implications
10
such an intervention might have. After all Mansfield was aware that
never in the history of the United States had the United States
intervened on such a scale proposed by the Greek-Turkish aid bill in
a time of peace. Realizing this intervention might be setting some
bad precedents, he wanted to be on record citing the inherent traps of
13such an initiative. Thus, on March 30, 1947, the Boston Herald
paraphrased Mansfield to the effect that Mansfield thought American aid
to Greece and Turkey could lead to an American type of imperialism and
possibly create a precedent for repetition of such aid in a patchwork
14effort to dam the western world against a militant communism. Not
yet meaning to be a Cassandra, Mansfield was merely analyzing all
possible long-term effects of U.S. aid in Greece and Turkey.
He also wanted his fellow congressmen to realize that U.S. aid
would be supporting two notoriously corrupt governments. From his own
sources, which included a trip he had taken to Greece and Turkey, he
knew corruption ran rampant throughout the dictatorships of Greece and
Turkey. He warned that it would be naive for Congress to believe
democracies in Greece and Turkey would flower out of U.S. aid, and he
suggested that U.S. aid should be only given based on Greece and
Turkey1s progression toward democracy.^ He pointed out to his fellow
colleagues that in Greece and Turkey the wealthiest did not pay any
taxes. Why, he asked, should the United States support the governments
of Greece and Turkey when the wealthiest citizens of Greece and Turkey
were not doing their part to support the development of their own
16countries? Consequently, in his view, economic and military aid from
11
the United States would go to waste if Turkey and Greece remained 
politically and socially regressive.
Mansfield believed that, in part, the success of U.S. aid depended
upon the nature of the government receiving the aid; it was senseless
to give aid to governments whose actions made enemies among their own
citizens. Accordingly, on April 21, 1947, he put forth in the House
Foreign Affairs Committee an amendment he hoped to attach to the Greek-
Turkish aid bill which stated that "any government furnished assistance
under this Act [aid to Greece and Turkey] shall agree to undertake
within six months after the enactment thereof a bona fide effort through
taxation to support its own national reconstruction, rehabilitation,
and e c o n o m y . M a n s f i e l d  commented U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey
would be successful only if the United States "help[ed] these people
to help themselves." The United States, he believed, would make a
18great mistake if it bore "the entire burden." Political concerns 
also provided a compelling reason for Mansfield’s ambivalence on aid 
to Greece and Turkey. The majority of letters from Montana which poured 
into Mansfield’s office adamantly opposed the United States sending aid 
to Turkey and Greece. Some of his constituents worried that the Truman 
administration was leading the country down the path to war with the 
Soviet Union; others railed against the United States protecting for 
the British what they could no longer protect for themselves. Some 
asserted U.S. aid only protected the assets of the rich in Greece and 
propped up corrupt governments. From Butte, Montana, came a letter 
signed by fifteen "miner’s[sic] wives" who were "horrified at the idea
12
of spending our dollars, and, inevitably, our boys, to support monarchy
anywhere in the world— the though[sic] is wholly un-American." And
they were "opposed to the idea of intervention on either side of a
19civil war in any other country." "Feed the starving, yes"; the
letter went on, "Butt in on any other country*s internal affairs, no."
And they believed the U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey would "nullify the 
20United Nations." From Missoula, Montana, Mr. and Mrs. H. Colomb sent
Mansfield a card which stated: "We strongly object to the plan of
President Truman in sending military aid to Greece and the passing up 
21of the U.N." From Billings, Montana, Horace E. Jones wrote: "Mr.
Truman is trying to embark the US on an imperialistic course partici­
pating in the internal affairs of foreign nations, which is similar to 
the past conduct of France and England which the people of America have 
condemned for many years." Mr. Jones continued: "If we are going to
successfully stop the spread of communism, it wonTt be by such outmoded 
tactics as power politics. It will be to cooperate with other demo­
cratic nations in the U.N. to help European nations to get on their 
feet economically, together with a long range program to increase world
trade and world prosperity. . . . The only chance we have for permanent
22peace is to work with the U.N. and try to make it effective."
Mansfield’s amendment failed to make it out of committee, but he 
offered a second one to the Greek-Turkish aid bill which stated "nor 
shall any of the loans, credits or grants be used for the payment, 
allowance, and maintenance of any army foreign to that country." In 
explaining his reasons for offering this amendment, Mansfield, in his
13
laconic style of speech, stated before the House of Representatives
that he did "not want to see American funds used for further maintenance
of the British brigade in Greece," or for the support of "a mercenary 
23Army." He reasoned Greek and Turkish communist insurgents would gain
political clout from the presence of foreign armies. That amendment
also failed to gain any support.
Last, Mansfield's participation in the implementation of the
Marshall Plan also must be viewed in order to understand Mansfield's
approach to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Unlike aid to
Greece and Turkey, Mansfield never questioned U.S. aid to Western
Europe. Responding to the queries of his constituents whether or not
he intended to support the European Recovery Plan, Mansfield answered
with a form letter which said: "I want you to know I am and have been
in wholehearted accord with the idea of the European Recovery Plan as
it applies to Europe. I feel this program is necessary from three
points of view: (1) the humanitarian aspect; (2) the economic aspect,
in that we hope it will bring about the rehabilitation of Europe; and
(3) because of its importance from our own national security point of 
f»24view.
Mansfield recognized the humanitarian need for vast amounts of
American aid to Europe from travels throughout Europe in September 1947
when he personally witnessed the food shortages and the economic
25stagnation across the continent. Upon his return from Europe, in 
a private meeting with President Truman, Mansfield conveyed to Truman 
Europe's immediate need of aid and urged the President to call a
14
special session of the Congress "to consider the Marshall proposal and
26any necessary stop-gap aid in the meantime."
As evidence Mansfield considered the Marshall Plan absolutely 
essential to American security and world peace and prosperity. In 
1951 he authored a report for the Congress entitled "A Survey of 
Political and Economic Developments During 1950 in Western Germany, 
Austria, Trieste, Italy, Spain and Portugal" in which he described the 
intent of the Marshall Plan. "It was designed," he wrote, "partly to 
achieve recovery and partly to block communist aggression in Europe." 
"But," he continued, "fundamentally, a prime object was to eradicate a 
major cause of war." And that cause of war had been "the nations of 
Europe . . . engaged in a cutthroat competitive battle." According to 
the report, out of this battle came "trade barriers against their
neighbors" and, conversely, Europe1s ignorance of what was really in
27its interest: economic cooperation. Mansfield also commented, "If
it were not for the Marshall Plan, in all likelihood all of Western 
Europe today would be Communist, and instead of spending the dollars
we are on the European Recovery Program we would be isolated . . .
28without much in the way of friends."
Also, unlike Greece and Turkey, he believed that the majority of 
West European governments were not repressive but progressive. 
Mansfield therefore thought that U.S. aid to Europe could make an 
impact. He believed it would quickly turn Europe around economically 
and would pay itself off in the end as the United States would be 
guaranteed markets to sell products.
15
For all his support, however, Mansfield did fret that the Marshall 
Plan comprised too much, with its encompassing economic and military 
aid to Western Europe, continuation of military aid to Greece and 
Turkey, and provisions for military aid to China. It scattered U.S. 
aid around the world, whieh limited any effect and overextended the 
resources of the United States. On March 31, 1948, Mansfield commented 
that the Foreign Assistance Bill, which outlined the dispersal of 
foreign aid proposed under the Marshall Plan, was "a perplexing com­
bination of economic and military assistance to countries scattered 
all over the world." He then introduced an amendment which cut all 
assistance to Greece, Turkey, and China. He believed it futile to 
combine economic assistance to Western Europe with military assistance 
to Turkey, Greece, and China. The problems of Western Europe, Greece, 
Turkey, and China, were very different, complex, and thus required 
separate hearings and separate appropriations. Mansfield admitted this 
would take time but argued the seriousness of each situation required 
that Congress not rush or send aid haphazardly. He warned the United 
States must be careful not to establish a precedent of sending aid 
around the world without reassurances the aid would be useful. Also, 
since the United States’ "resources" were "limited," Americans would
have "to decide— as during the war— where to place our emphasis and
29greatest effort." Of course to Mansfield the first priority was 
Western Europe. On the other hand, he clearly believed China was the 
antithesis of Europe; any U.S. aid sent would be a waste.
Mansfield had gained firsthand knowledge about China when Franklin 
Roosevelt sent him on a fact-finding trip to China in November of 1944.
16
From this trip Mansfield gained a good idea of the corruption which
infiltrated all parts of Chiang Kai-shek's government. In part,
because of this experience he lobbied against the United States sending
any more aid to China. In March 1948 he told the House that from the
end of World War Two the United States had sent to China $844,721,000
in military aid, $907,107,000 "for relief, rehabilitation, and trade
development, $4,155,000 for fiscal aid, and $30,350,000 for educational
and philanthropic aid and even with all of this aid, ChiangTs government
had failed to record any measurable military victories, or political
and economic improvements." He could see no reason to continue to
30contribute until Chiang instituted reform.
Three points stand out from Mansfield's reactions to Greek-Turkish 
aid and the Marshall Plan. First, Mansfield never considered the Soviet 
Union to be the primary threat to the security of Western Europe or, 
for that fact, to the security of the West. Mansfield's training in 
history, his years as a lecturer of history, and his study of foreign 
affairs may have been responsible for his position in regard to the 
Soviet Union. In a number of speeches he contended that West European 
nations had been the aggressors, not Russia. He pointed out that two 
world wars had been conceived in Europe and more specifically Western 
Europe. Mansfield's objective view on the Soviet Union allowed him to 
approach the problems of the Cold War in a way very different from many 
of his contemporaries.
Second, Mansfield's priority was to ensure the future of Europe, 
and especially Western Europe. Mansfield hesitated sending aid to
17
Greece and Turkey because he believed the aid would be wasted; however, 
Mansfield could not have shown more enthusiasm and support for sending 
aid to Western Europe. He believed with American aid and guidance, 
Western Europe could create an economic and political union similar to 
that of the United States. He reasoned such a union would reduce the 
drain on U.S. resources and would create a third power which would 
effectively counterbalance the bipolar world of the United States and 
the Soviet Union.
Third, Mansfield established a set of criteria by which to judge 
whether aid should be granted to a particular country. First, he asked 
whether the country in need of U.S. aid had a progressive form of 
government or would be willing to work toward such a type of government. 
Second, he asked if the country in need of aid had a significant value 
for Western security needs. For instance, in the case of China, he 
lobbied against sending more U.S. aid to Chiang because Mansfield 
considered China of little strategic value and because of Chiangfs 
repeated failure to institute reform.
Thus, up to this point in Mansfield’s political career, he 
advocated a well-balanced, objective approach to world problems, not 
allowing one concern to dominate his thinking. For a brief period in 
his life, however, that would change.
In 1950 and 1951 an apparent shift occurred in Mansfield’s approach 
to world affairs. In his political speeches, he argued that the Soviet 
Union had become a primary threat to Western security. Two events may 
have caused this shift: the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in
18
June 1950 and Mansfield1s decision in the fall of 1951 to challenge
incumbent Republican Senator Zales Ecton.
Virtually all American leaders believed that the USSR masterminded
North Korea*s invasion of South Korea. They assumed North Korean
leader Kim II Sung was a mere puppet of Stalin. Thus, the real
significance of the invasion of South Korea, according to the Truman
administration, was Stalin*s desire to see how the West would respond
to such an attack, keeping with an eye toward the possibility of the
Red Army invading Western Europe. Because of these assumptions,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson assumed that if the United States
allowed North Korea to attack South Korea unimpeded it would be only
31a matter of time before a large Red Army invaded Western Europe.
Mansfield shared the Truman administration*s belief that the
Soviet Union intended to invade Western Europe. In July 1951, speaking
before an audience in Butte, Montana, Mansfield said that the "North
Korean aggression compelled the free world to revise its estimate of
Soviet intention." In light of the Korean invasion, the Truman
administration needed to "bolster western defenses and to fortify the
morale of Western Europeans who dread an occupation by Red troops.*'
Because of the massive Soviet army in Eastern Europe, Mansfield
concurred with the Truman administration's decision to send four
divisions of U.S. troops to join the two divisions already in Western 
32Europe.
Throughout 1951 Mansfield freely infused hard core Cold War 
rhetoric in his speeches. On one occasion he said initial aid to
19
Greece and Turkey, which he supported in 1947 with many reservations,
"was the real beginning of our [the United States’] struggle to guard
the Nation against the new tyranny looming on the horizon." The
Marshall Plan had "prevented the Soviet Union from striking for world
domination and precipitating a general war.” This latter statement also
reflected a previously unstated perspective on the Marshall Plan. And
as a politician known for his reticence, it appeared out of character
for Mansfield to refer to the Soviet Union as an enemy who was "ruthless"
33and willing to "stop at nothing." Although he had supported the
Greek-Turkish aid bill and the Marshall Plan, in part because both
would discourage any designs the Soviet Union had for Western Europe,
he never previously paid so much heed to the Soviet Union as a threat
to Western security.
Whatever his earlier attitudes in 1951 and 1952, the Cold War
reached a new level of intensity; and Mansfield, an astute politician
running for office, gauged the mood of the country. The Soviet Union’s
detonation of their first nuclear bomb in 1949 and the "loss" of China
to the communists in the same year alarmed many Americans. The impact
of the latter two events in the United States manifested itself in the
initial popular support for the red-baiting tactics of Senator Joe 
34McCarthy.
These events dominated political debate as Mansfield decided to 
challenge incumbent Senator Zales Ecton. Shortly after entering the 
senatorial race, Mansfield found himself in the campaign of his 
political career. Senator Joe McCarthy, never a friend of Mansfield,
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went so far as to send former communist Harvey Matusow out to Montana
to spread rumors that Mike Mansfield sympathized with communist 
35causes. As evidence of Mansfield's sympathy for the communist cause,
Matusow cited the report on China Mansfield wrote after returning from
China in November 1944. Mansfield had been very objective in his
analysis of the political environment in China. He noted that the
Chinese communists received popular support due, in part, to the
corruption within Chiang's national government. He then stated that
if Chiang started to implement serious reform, the communists would
start to lose the support of the people. In fact, Mansfield pointed
out that the agricultural reforms implemented in parts of China were
the key to the communists' support among the Chinese people and that
Chiang needed to implement agricultural reform in order to beat the
Chinese communists at their own game. Roosevelt praised the report
for its objectivity and clairvoyance. However, in 1952 with the Red
Scare at its peak, objectivity and clairvoyance could be easily skewed
and twisted about to demonstrate that Mike Mansfield was indeed a
36"communist sympathizer."
His final campaign speech responded to the charge that he 
sympathized with the cause of the Chinese communists. In it he went 
out of his way to prove himself a true cold warrior, especially to 
voters of eastern Montana who were considered to be generally con­
servative in political outlook and who did not know Mansfield's 
political philosophy as well as voters from the western half of the 
state. In this speech he stressed how he had been attacked by Pravda
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and Radio Moscow, how he "stood up under the abuse of Malik and 
Vishinsky" as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations, and how he had 
introduced a bill outlawing the communist party in the United States.
He highlighted how he had voted for the McCarran Internal Security Act 
to keep undesirable aliens from entering the United States, and how he 
had voted for the Mundt—Nixon bill making communist organizations 
register with the United States government. He told his audience that 
he had worked to prevent "the Soviet army from overrunning Europe and 
the Middle East, Burma, India, Indo-China, and Japan and eventually, 
South America." And then he told the Montanans that to halt Soviet 
expansionism in its tracks, the American people must be willing to 
spend billions of dollars on American armed forces and America's 
allies.^
In spite of the campaign rhetoric, Mansfield's approach to foreign 
affairs remained consistent in Congress. He refused to allow the 
tensions of the Cold War to dictate his actions in Congress in regard 
to foreign affairs. For instance, in the winter of 1951 President 
Truman recommended that four more U.S. divisions be sent to Western 
Europe in support of the two divisions already there. In response to 
this development, Mansfield declared that although there was strong 
"opposition" in the United States to the sending of four U.S. divisions 
to Western Europe in 1951, he would support the decision to send these 
troops because he believed these additional troops would give incentive 
to Western Europeans "to get down to business, integrate its economy, 
do away with custom barriers, work out a political union on the basis
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of a United States of Europe, and furnish the divisions needed in the
common defense which, in each instance and in the last analysis, is in
38its own defense as well as ours."
To show how seriously Mansfield took European integration,
Mansfield opposed an amendment in October 1931 which would have reduced
U.S. economic and military assistance to Western Europe by $200,000,000
because he reasoned that the sooner industries in Western Europe vital
to Western security— such as coal, steel, various armament industries—
were operating at or near full capacity, the sooner the security of the
West would be adequately enhanced. This would deny a Soviet threat and
39allow the United States to reduce its presence in Western Europe.
Mansfield1s participation in the debate in Congress in the winter
of 1951 over sending four more U.S. divisions to Western Europe further
illustrated the consistency in his approach to foreign policy apart
from his politicking. While Representative James Richards spoke out
against any reduction in military aid to Western Europe, Mansfield
interrupted: "Our purpose is not to prolong this program but to bring
it to an end and get the American troops out of Europe." To which
Representative Richards responded, "We want to get American troops out
of Europe, . . . and if you are going to get them out, you are going
40to have to put Europeans in a position to carry this load." And in 
the middle of Representative Walter Judd’s argument for full funding 
of military aid to Western Europe, Mansfield asked Judd if cuts were 
made would that mean "instead of terminating this program [military 
assistance to Western Europe] in 1954, as we hope, and bringing about
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the withdrawal of American troops, it will prolong the program?" Judd
responded that assistance to Western Europe could possibly be prolonged
if not fully funded. Less funding would definitely weaken the defense
41and security of Europe and the United States.
But Representative Hoffman contested the logic of Judd’s and
Mansfield's statements. He questioned even if Congress did not cut
military aid to Europe, "this program of sending our dollars and men
42to serve the interests of other nations is going to end." Repre­
sentative Hoffman thought it nonsense to believe that American troops 
and American economic aid could be stopped just like that. He pointed 
out that a strong precedent of aiding Western Europe had already been 
established, one which would be difficult to end. However, at this 
point, Mansfield sincerely believed that with U.S. assistance, in a 
few years, strong Western European economies would deter Soviet 
aggression and eventually allow the discontinuation of U.S. aid. Thus, 
the determinant, to Mansfield, for the withdrawal of American troops 
from Western Europe would come when Western Europe's industries 
adequately recovered from the destruction of World War Two.
Thus, from 1950 to 1952, at least in terms of his campaign rhetoric,
Mansfield cut the figure of a true cold warrior, which seemed to be a
dramatic shift in Mansfield's approach to foreign policy. As one
student said of Mansfield during these years: "Mansfield's greatest
change in position [regarding U.S. foreign policy], when comparing the 
1950s to the rest of his career, occurred in his view of Communism. . . . 
In the 1950s, Mansfield saw Communism as monolithic, dominated by
24
43Moscow, and he favored the containment policy." But the question 
must be asked : To what degree was Mansfield a true cold warrior in
the 1950s? Mansfield was an astute politician, and sensing the shift 
in the mood of the American public in regard to the Soviet Union, he 
too shifted. Thus Mansfield, out of political necessity, presented 
himself as a true cold warrior. However, Mansfield’s appearance as a 
cold warrior was just that— an appearance. After examining his actions 
in Congress over the same period, a truer picture of Mansfield's 
approach to foreign affairs emerges. Simply, Mansfield was playing 
two roles: one as a politician working hard to beat an incumbent
senator, and the other as a statesman concerned about the welfare of 
not only the United States but also other nations. Ultimately he 
would be both a successful politician and an indefatigable statesman. 
The campaign against Zales Ecton would be his last tightly contested 
election. He would easily win his next three contests, which allowed
44him to be more of a statesman and less of a politician under the gun.
When Mansfield returned to Washington in the fall of 1952 as a 
senator his reputation as an expert on foreign affairs earned him a 
seat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His first major speech 
on U.S. foreign policy as a senator in April 1953 marked the return, in 
full force, of Mansfield's true approach to foreign policy. In regard 
to Western Europe he asserted the United States "should continue to 
urge and to assist the Europeans towards economic integration. Beyond 
integration, the need is for trade not aid." "NATO build-up must go 
on," he continued, but the United States "should continue to urge and
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to assist the Europeans towards economic integration.11 He considered
the economic integration of Western Europe and trade, not unilateral
aid, between Western Europe and the United States as essential to
45Western security.
By 1953 Mansfield also set out to change the role of American
economic aid to Western Europe. Essentially, Mansfield believed the
United States had done all it could do for Western Europe by 1953. To
back up his point, Mansfield pointed out that foreign aid to Western
Europe had reached the point of diminishing returns. In 1952, for the
first time since the war, Western Europe’s industrial production did
46not rise above the previous year's. He attributed this economic
stagnation to the fact that West Europeans were becoming complacent
about the status of their economy knowing that they could count on U.S.
aid. Mansfield went on to insist that "one-way assistance over too
long a period tended to separate rather than bring together the giver
and receiver." To correct this situation Mansfield wanted an aid
47program "mutual in reality, not just in name." Strengthening trade 
between the United States and Western Europe presented the mechanism, 
to Mansfield, which would create a true mutual relationship to Western 
Europe and the United States.
While he understood that foreign aid to Western Europe would not 
be ended in 1953, Mansfield recommended that aid to Western Europe be 
administered by the Department of State or Department of Defense, 
instead of an independent agency. For Mansfield, who was always 
thinking about the taxpayer's pocketbook, an independent agency 
administering aid to Western Europe created costly duplication.
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Failing to convince his fellow senators to dissolve the Mutual
Security Agency (the agency responsible for administering aid to
Western Europe) did not deter Mansfield from calling for the complete
termination of economic and military aid to Western Europe a year later.
He repeated the same arguments against aid to Western Europe made the
previous year: aid to Western Europe had become cumbersome in the
relationship between the United States and Western Europe; and instead
of ’’helping out” it was hindering the economic development of Western
Europe. "The time has come," he said in the spring of 1954, "to
abolish the Foreign Operations Administration [the successor of the
48Mutual Security Agency] as an independent agency." This time he
suggested, in very blunt terms, that indiscriminate aid to Western
Europe put "proud, independent nations in the position of being eternal
recipients of charity," and American aid put "lazy and ineffective
governments in the position of not having to exert themselves on behalf
of the people they are supposed to serve since they can count on support
49from this country." Further, the U.S. foreign aid program had created 
a bureaucratic monster, one which had shown great resilience to budget 
cuts leaving Mansfield with the impression that the longer Foreign 
Operations existed, the harder it would be to end it.^
Events seemed to support Representative Hoffman’s prediction that 
even after achieving the political and economic stability in Western 
Europe, U.S. aid to Western Europe would be difficult to stop. By 1954, 
even though the political and economic crises in Western Europe were 
largely over, U.S. foreign aid continued to flow to Western Europe.
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The Mutual Security Act of 1951 named June 30, 1954 as its termination 
date. However, in the spring of 1954 the Eisenhower administration 
requested that the program be extended until June 30, 1958.
Mansfield*s original support for economic and military aid to 
Western Europe depended, in part, on his impression that by 1954 
Western Europe would be able to provide for its own defense. This 
extension was unacceptable to him. He worried that aid to Western 
Europe was becoming an end in itself. A "philosophy of continuous, 
unending foreign aid [was] becoming engrafted upon our government," 
he said. To bring appropriations for foreign aid under control, 
Mansfield recommended that if a country needed military or economic 
aid, then the Department of State should present "specific" military 
and economic aid packages to Congress. He advocated reestablishing the 
administration of aid through the State Department.^
Mansfield continued to push for the economic and military 
integration of Western Europe in the hope of ending the need for U.S. 
aid. Western Europe, he said, should develop "a pattern of progressive 
integration within the larger but looser unity of the North Atlantic 
Community," which, he believed, would result in a "steady growth" of 
peace and material progress. He believed that if Western Europe did 
not integrate, eventually war would be "inevitable11 and possibly result 
in "the extinction of human life itself." As on many other occasions, 
Mansfield also pushed for Western Europe*s unification out of his 
realization that the last two wars had been "self-inflicted." Western 
Europe had been responsible for two world wars. Thus, Mansfield
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perceived U.S. aid to be dangerous to the Western society because it
allowed Western Europe to flounder in the pursuit of a united Western 
52Jiurope.
During the second session of the 84th Congress Mansfield presented
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a “Review of Foreign Policy."
He labeled the sixth review "United States Policy and a Changing
Europe." In his report he stated that economic assistance to Western
Europe under the Marshall Plan, military containment in Western Europe,
and the Point Four Plan were "bold, intelligent and effective policies 
53at the time." They had done the job; they had rebuilt Western Europe
and maintained the security of Western Europe and the United States.
By 1956 a fast paced and ever-changing world needed a dynamic foreign
policy to meet new challenges. Mansfield told his colleagues that "a
foreign policy effective once is not a foreign policy effective forever.
For three years we have lived on borrowed time in foreign relations. We
have been carried along; we have been supported by the momentum of
54ideas and the strenuous efforts previously put forth."
After reviewing U.S. foreign policy for the previous three years, 
he complained that innovation and flexibility essential to a successful 
foreign policy were lacking in the United States1 approach to foreign 
affairs. He believed that policy-makers had "fallen into the erroneous 
assumption that dollars are the answer or a better Voice of America or 
more military aid, or this that or the other." Policy-makers failed to 
recognize that "situations elsewhere" were not "completely within our 
control." "There are times," he said, "to do less is better than to do
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more.11 However, these limitations were "not an invitation to irrespon­
sible drift, dodge or d e f e a t i s m . H e  made it clear he did not want 
to make a political issue out of his analysis of foreign policy as it 
stood in 1956. How could he? The outdated policies he wanted changed
had been developed and initiated by a Democratic administration, and
56many Democrats still advocated full support for them. Still, he felt 
that all branches of government dealing with foreign affairs should 
make a concerted effort to adapt to the world confronting the United 
States.
By the end of 1957 Mansfield1s approach to foreign policy had 
fully developed. He had concluded that major adjustments were needed 
in foreign policies of the United States. While he advocated changes 
be made to the United States1 foreign assistance program, he also 
believed the arms race of the Cold War presented too many opportunities 
to escalate into tragedy; it must be curtailed and he hoped to start 
the process by altering the United States’ role in Western Europe. In 
fact, a year after suggesting that aid be discontinued to Western 
Europe, Mansfield delivered a speech in August of 1957 titled "A 
Foreign Policy for Peace" in which he suggested that no country could 
achieve "absolute security" because the perfect offensive or defensive 
weapon would never exist. Instead, there were "degrees of insecurity" 
which could be lowered through an "effective foreign policy." The best 
way to lower "degrees of insecurity," according to Mansfield, was 
through disarmament. He confessed this would happen only when U.S. 
foreign policy based itself less "on fear of the Russians" and more on
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"the intelligence, the courage and steadfastness" of the American
i 58people.
Thus, the issue of ending military and economic aid to Western 
Europe became a springboard to his ultimate goal— instituting a 
dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy. On a very practical level, 
ending U.S. aid to Western Europe would result in the reduction of 
U.S. financial burdens. He also hoped that ending U.S. aid to Western 
Europe would force the Europeans to integrate themselves into a viable 
third power which would act as a balance between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. More important still, Mansfield hoped that a 
reduction in U.S. economic and military aid to Western Europe might 
act as a catalyst for mutual disarmament by reducing the tension 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Mansfield continued to speak out against the wasteful ways in which
foreign aid was appropriated. Speaking before the Senate in 1959 he
said much of U.S. foreign aid did not have any "specific objectives,
specific yardsticks against which to measure cost in any rational
fashion." Rather, he said, "We have only generalizations. The program
is supposed to ’stop communism.' Where? How? When?" He continued,
"The program is supposed to prime underdeveloped nations to the point
59of economic self-propulsion. Which nations? What point?" He 
believed U.S. aid could continue to be beneficial only if properly 
appropriated. Mansfield pointed out that delaying reform was resulting 
in rising pressure in the Senate, which, he believed, would result in 
someone reaching "for the meat-axe instead of a scalpel in dealing with 
foreign-aid appropriations."^
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The real problem, as Mansfield saw it, was the granting of
military aid, which was the majority of foreign aid given out by the
61United States in 1959. Mansfield believed the United States gave
billions of dollars in "grants and gifts" of military aid which, unlike
the aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, was intended not to
help countries become self-sustaining defensively. In fact, he did
not see a clear goal in granting the majority of military aid. He
proposed to change what he believed "the principal shortcomings" of
foreign aid in 1951. He believed "the area of heavy and continuing
gifts and grants of military aid which this year [1959] total $1.6
billion out of the total of $3.9 billion requested." He put military
aid into two categories: "continuing grants" and "special assistance
grants." Both types of military aid were, he said, "areas of decay in
foreign aid." He said:
These [military grants and gifts over the last 
nine years] are the areas in which, over the 
years, a one-sided dependency has developed for 
which an end is not yet in sight. These are 
the areas in which the fissures of corruption 
have begun to appear. These are the areas of 
great waste and inefficiency. These are the 
areas of burgeoning hostility between the American 
people who must foot the bill and the peoples of 
the recipient nations who, sometimes, as distinct 
from their governments, see very little benefit 
from the hundreds of millions, the billions that 
have been poured into their l a n d s . ^2
Thus, to bring legitimacy to U.S. foreign aid, Mansfield recommended
that gifts and grants be substituted with loans, that advisors be sent
to help the nations requesting aid to increase their productivity, and
that the creation of an aid program including the participation of many
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nations be created. Above all else, he insisted that all "give-away
shall cease." If these practices did not change soon, Mansfield
warned, ultimately "popular reaction" would take over, destroying the
"good [aid] with the bad, the essential with the non-essential." He
63declared that would be even a greater tragedy.
By 1961 Mansfield1s critique of the American foreign aid program
illustrated this issue went beyond politics. He had criticized the
Eisenhower administration for not coming up with a new, innovative
approach to foreign aid. Similarly, in 1961 on the Senate floor, he
did not hesitate to criticize the Kennedy administrations lack of
imagination on foreign aid; he called their policies "sporific," a
"jumble of illusory expectations" and "not significantly different in
substance from that of the previous year, despite the change in party
6 4shingles on the door of the Executive Branch." He continued to
maintain that the aid program needed to be "recast" in order to "serve
65the interests of the nation more effectively." Although Mansfield
did vote for the foreign aid package (he now was Majority Leader of 
the Senate), he did so with reservations. He worried about the colossus 
the military aid program had become. It seemed to have a mind of its 
own. Military aid, he said, should not be given just because a country 
requested it. Military aid should be appropriated corresponding to the 
United States1 "defense needs." He charged that military aid had given 
birth to "the costly trappings of bureaucracy" in nations of little or 
no strategic importance for U.S. security. In short, military aid 
given out by the United States had become a behemoth, given to fifty
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nations around the world, many of which also received "massive
infusions of economic grants to support military establishments, built
66and sustained by military aid from the United States." He asked his 
colleagues,
Who in this body should not feel concern when 
in country after country, after years of this 
program since the Marshall Plan, grants of aid 
from this nation remain the critical factor in 
maintaining internal stability, and the end of 
this process is not yet in sight? Who in this 
body [the Senate] should not feel concern when 
hundreds of millions of aid goes to governments 
which have not met or are unwilling to meet 
honest tests of public acceptance in their own 
countries? Who in this body should not feel 
concern when the gap between the luxurious life 
of the few in and around governments and the 
poverty-stricken like of the millions in aid- 
receiving nations does not begin to close and, 
all too frequently, the beneficial impact of the 
bulk of our assistance is limited to the few?67
In essence, the heart of the problem was "that foreign aid must change
or in the end it may still produce catastrophic consequences for this
Mansfield was reacting to a change of policy in granting foreign
aid which Nicholas Eberstadt in his book, Foreign Aid and American
Purpose, called "the most fateful departure from previously enunciated
69principles of foreign aid." The departure, according to Eberstadt, 
had occurred during the Eisenhower years. Between 1949 and 1953 
"military grants and political aid for beleaguered but friendly regimes 
had accounted for scarcely a sixth of our foreign aid: between 1953
and 1961 they made up over half our b e q u e s t s . C e r t a i n l y ,  nations
like Greece, Turkey, Thailand, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan had
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benefited from such assistance, as each nation moved toward political
stability. However, the first principles of granting aid as set forth
by the Marshall Plan were being lost. Instead of granting aid to
develop "the basic infrastructure so that governments of poor societies
might better take advantage of the economic opportunities offered them
by growing international markets," as had previously been the rule, aid
was granted predominantly to buy political stability.^ This departure,
begun by the Eisenhower administration and taken to a new height by the
Kennedy administration, during which the distinction between development
assistance and security assistance was completely lost, caused Mansfield 
72to worry.
Mansfield had been a keen and worried observer of U.S. foreign 
policy as it developed in response to the Cold War. As a congressman 
he supported the Truman administration's plan to rebuild Western Europe, 
to meet the challenges of the Soviet Union and, in general, to secure 
peace and prosperity; but he never believed the U.S.-USSR confrontation 
should dominate U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, Mansfield saw weak 
points in the Truman administration's plan to secure peace and pros­
perity. First, the misappropriation of American foreign aid greatly 
worried Mansfield, and he spoke out against such misappropriations. 
Furthermore, Mansfield worried that the Truman Doctrine's open-ended 
commitment to aid nations throughout the world in their fight against 
communism would allow nations to blackmail the United States into 
giving unnecessary aid. Eventually, as U.S. grants and gifts of 
military aid outgrew economic assistance, at times given to undemocratic
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nations with little or no strategic significance to the United States, 
MansfieldTs fears were becoming realities. In fact, by 1953 Mansfield 
concluded that the Cold War was dominating U.S. foreign policy. Thus, 
he became a consistent critic of U.S. foreign policy.
By 1959 Mansfield decided to initiate serious debate in the Senate 
on the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy. He hoped that by high­
lighting past and present mistakes a better approach to foreign policy 
would be instituted. The crisis over Berlin, from 1959 to 1962, 
became Mansfield1s issue with which to show the errors in U.S. foreign 
policy and hopefully find some sort of viable solutions.
CHAPTER TWO
BERLIN: THE TURNING POINT
Partition is the expedient of 
tired statesmen.
— Conor Cruise O'Brien
Divided between the allies after the defeat of the Nazis, Berlin 
became by 1948 the fulcrum of the Cold War. From 1948 to 1961 sporadic 
crises arose over Berlin as East and West confronted each other. By 
1959 West Berlin symbolized the economic prosperity achieved by Western 
Europe in the postwar era, while East Berlin, economically stagnating, 
epitomized the economic backwardness of the communist block.^
The crisis over Berlin from 1958 to 1961 first materialized when 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union would 
recognize East Germany and turn over control to the East Germans' 
Western access routes to West Berlin. This meant that Western nations 
would have to negotiate with East Germany in order to gain access to 
West Berlin. However, since the United States, France and Britain did 
not recognize East Germany as a country, such an arrangement would 
naturally create problems. Khrushchev's strategy was to force the West 
to choose the lesser of the evils and withdraw from West Berlin.
Mansfield took great interest in the reunification of Germany. In 
a 1954 speech Mansfield proclaimed the failure of the last half century 
had been the "inability of modern Germany to find a stable place in the
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2common destiny of Western Europe." Although he supported the
integration of West Germany into a West European alliance, unlike many
of his contemporaries, he was optimistic about the reunification of
Germany in the near future. In fact, Mansfield believed that there
could be "little hope of stability in Europe" with a divided Germany.
Only, he continued, with a "peaceful and independent Germany able to
participate in the common development of Europe and to cooperate with
3free nations everywhere" could world peace be secured.
In response to the Berlin crisis, Mansfield wrote a letter to the
4New York Times in February 1959 suggesting that Berlin be reunified.
He believed through a free election the majority of West Berliners and 
East Berliners would vote for a democratic government, in effect making 
Berlin a free, unified, democratic city. Eventually he hoped the same 
process would be used for the unification of West and East Germany.
He also proposed nine points that would ensure both East and West 
security needs if German unification came about. In the nine points he 
emphasized the West must not withdraw their "forces of freedom."
Clearly, Mansfield did not wish to put the wrong impression in anyone’s 
mind that the West was about to abandon West Berlin; rather he supported 
a resolution which supported the position of the Eisenhower administra­
tion to "stand fast at Berlin.""* Point two recommended that German 
leaders be given support to begin negotiations to unite public services 
and create one municipal government of East and West Berlin. Berlin 
already had a common subway system; if this was possible, then why not 
other public services and eventually one municipal government?
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Mansfield hoped that municipal unification of East and West Berlin
would be the catalyst to the "unification for all of Germany." He
also called for the Secretary General of the United Nations to be
"enlisted" in the negotiations to develop one Berlin government.^ Once
unification had been achieved, the United Nations would replace all
communist and allied forces in guaranteeing access routes to Berlin.
Mansfield would "prefer to see the whole city of Berlin neutralized on
an interim basis, under United Nations auspices . . . rather than to
have East German agents of the Soviet Union stamping the permits of
8western allied transports to West Berlin."
The Eisenhower administration1s reaction to the Berlin crisis
discouraged Mansfield. If the Soviet Union wished to withdraw their
troops from Berlin, or East Germany, or Central Europe, the United
States should make every effort to encourage the Soviet Union to do so.
But, he stated, "Present [U.S.] policy says, in effect, that the
9Russians must stay in Berlin— in spirit, if not in body." And he
went on to say:
I am fully aware that their [the Soviet Army] 
going may complicate our remaining in Berlin.
We shall be face to face, then, with East 
Germans. They will be Communists, to be sure—  
but, nevertheless, Germans, not Russians. The 
allied forces may well be compelled, in the 
last analysis, to face them, if we mean to 
stay in Berlin at all costs.10
Mansfield1s point eight sought to appease the fears on the part
of all Germany's neighbors to a unified Germany. If an acceptable plan
of reunification to East and West materialized from the discussion by
the two Germanies, the Soviet Union and the Western allies should
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guarantee that Germany "is neither subjected to military pressure from 
its neighbors nor becomes a source of military pressures to its 
neighbors." Mansfield’s point eight» in effect, recommended a pro­
tectorship over Germany by democratic and communist countries together, 
an idea which had little support in Congress at the time.^
The crisis over Berlin was, in Mansfield’s opinion, just one of
the many problems which had and continued to impede the establishment
12of "equitable, rational and evolving, conditions of peace." Since
the end of World War Two, crisis after crisis has threatened world
peace, and in meeting these crises the United States has chosen what
Mansfield termed a "patchwork" policy to uphold the "sagging roof of
peace." Further, the efforts to uphold the "sagging roof of peace" had
been very costly with no guarantee that "peace would endure for the
next year, or even the next day." He asserted a policy of "patchwork"
13could not guarantee a safe world.
Of course, there were those in the Senate who attacked Mansfield’s
proposal for a free and neutral Germany as a dangerous idea which did
not take into account Cold War realities. Senator Jacob Javits refuted
Mansfield’s main points. In response to Mansfield's proposal that
eventually all foreign armies should withdraw from Berlin making it a
free city, Javits responded, Berlin as a free city would not last long.
14It would "speedily be incorporated into Communist Germany." Once
that happened, since "possession is more than nine-tenths of the law
in terms of international affairs," concluded Javits, all of Berlin
would be completely engulfed by the communists "unless we are prepared
15to go in with force."
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Mansfield and Javits also differed on which nations should 
organize the reunification of Germany. Mansfield proposed the Germans 
work out the problems of unification themselves, with limited advisory 
roles for England, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. 
Javits believed negotiations must be solely between the allies, with 
a limited role for the two Germanies. To Javits, since the Soviet 
Union dominated East Germany1s foreign policy, it made little sense 
for the two Germanies to negotiate unification. Javits also worried 
that as soon as the word was out that the United States had given its 
consent to allow East and West Germany to negotiate, it would send the 
message to the Soviet Union that the United States had given up 
protecting West Germany. Javits further argued that if the Soviet 
Union became infected with such an idea the Soviet Union would dictate 
the terms for unification of Germany.
Essentially, Senators Javits and Mansfield wanted the same result. 
Both men believed that a negotiated solution over Berlin between the 
United States and the Soviet Union could begin a thaw in the Cold War. 
However, they approached the question of German unification in two very 
different ways, which symbolized the differences in their approach to 
the making of foreign policy.
Mansfield asked Senator Javits how long would it be before the 
United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France sat down and 
seriously started to discuss German unification. In the next year, 
possibly the next ten, he asked. The State Department told Mansfield 
it might take ten years before serious negotiations would start between
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the four powers on the question of Germany. Mansfield went on to say 
that the occupying powers had failed to initiate meaningful negotiations 
for fourteen years* Mansfield saw no benefits in waiting a decade for 
the four powers to settle their differences, and there was no guarantee 
that they would settle their differences in ten years and start serious 
negotiations on the question of German unification. Mansfield therefore 
decided "to try to find other ways or means of bringing this question 
to a head, so it can be settled— and settled in a way which will be
beneficial to the interest of the free world and, in particular, of the
16German people." Because of the complexities which separated the
allies, Mansfield proposed side-stepping them by allowing East Germans
and West Germans to run the show. In fact this seemed to Mansfield as
the natural solution because already talks on unification were taking
place between the governments of West and East Berlin, albeit at lower
levels in government. Although Mansfield could not prove it, he
asserted high officials in the economic ministry of West Berlin had
held discussions with their East German counterparts for some time on
matters of unification. The evidence of the two Berlins working
together toward Berlin unification led Mansfield to quote a former
colleague in the House of Representatives, Representative Mike Mulroney,
to the effect that "I am going to call ’em as I see 'em."^
Mansfield ended his reply to Senator Javits by saying that the
impasse in Germany must be broken. He, for one, did not want to chance
another ten years of hot and cold spells between the East and West
18over the issues of Berlin and Germany. He believed that "so long as
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Germany remains partitioned, there will be no peace in Europe," and
19without peace in Europe, "there will be no peace in the world."
Mansfield pressed these ideas, not because he thought that they would
be implemented right away, but because they would spur debate over the
question of the unification of Berlin and Germany throughout the United
States. He wanted the United States "to do some thinking on the Berlin
and German situations" before some event dictated the actions of the
United States. He lamented that without a change in policy, events
20might lead policy as they had in Korea.
The Eisenhower administration skillfully managed to defuse the
Berlin crisis by recommending that the one-time allies negotiate their
differences over Berlin. But the Berlin crisis enforced in Mansfield's
mind that there was a need for a reassessment of America's approach to
world problems. Speaking before the 58th Session of the Inland Empire
Education Association on April 8, 1960, Mansfield analyzed the state
of United States foreign policy. As he did on other occasions,
Mansfield told his audience that an effective foreign policy served
"national needs in a complex world, a world of many nations and many
21needs, by methods other than those of the jungle." He warned the 
audience this was not an easy task; nor did he know of any easy
solutions in meeting the challenges presented by a complex world, but
the task could be made more difficult if those directly responsible 
for developing an effective foreign policy did not "see the world as 
it is." He said to the educational association that "We need to see 
it [the world situation] as it is now, before we can reasonably hope
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22to see it as we should like it to be." As for achieving world peace,
he confided to his audience that peace would not be achieved
by studying the applause meters or the comparative 
Hooper ratings of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower 
in India or France or wherever else they may
visit . . . Rather, it lies in the reduction of the
fears which push nations and systems of nations
towards military clash. It lies in a frank recog­
nition of conflicting national interests and 
ideological hopes and, if they cannot be reconciled 
at this time, in turning them away from the chan­
nels which lead to the nuclear destruction of a 
recognizable civilization in the world.23
In 1961 Khrushchev once again issued a missive to the United States,
England, and France that the Soviet Union intended to turn over access
routes to West Berlin to the East Germans. This time the problems of 
Berlin fell to a youthful, inexperienced, and untested Kennedy admin­
istration. Perceiving the inexperience of the Kennedy administration 
in foreign affairs, Khrushchev hoped to score an easy victory. However, 
Kennedy thought that by remaining firm against Khrushchev1s demands he
could prove his toughness. At the same time he could gain the
24confidence of the American people.
However, Mansfield's reaction to Khrushchev's ultimatum differed 
from Kennedy's. Mansfield considered that Berlin had been a nagging 
issue for too long. For fourteen years it had epitomized the inability 
of the United States and the Soviet Union to find a lasting solution 
for the German issue and world peace in general. Thus, Mansfield 
decided the time had arrived for him to offer a new approach to meet 
the security needs of Germans, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States. He did so in a speech he called "A Third Way On 
Berlin."
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Before presenting his third way on Berlin, Mansfield made it 
perfectly clear that the West would not bend to Soviet pressures. As 
in 1959 he reiterated the United States would never shed its respon­
sibility of guaranteeing freedom in West Berlin or a unified Berlin.
In effect, the Western powers would not leave West Berlin until there
were solid guarantees made by England, France, the United States, and
25the Soviet Union that Berlin would become and remain a "free city."
In fact, Mansfield told the Senate his view did not depend on "whether
the Soviet Premier means what he says or does not mean what he says."
Rather, he based his views on the changing situation in Western Europe
and his perception of how the United States ought to respond to those
changes for the common good of all. And he felt United States foreign
policy was not meeting the challenges of the modern world. He questioned
why present U.S. policy encouraged the Soviet Union to maintain troops
in "the Western most point of penetration which they [the Soviet Union]
reached in Europe in the wake of World War II." Further, he did not
think the United States
could safeguard most effectively [its] own 
interests or advance the interests of peace when 
we [the United States] insist upon remaining 
directly under a communist sword of Damocles, as 
is now the case in Berlin, if a rational alterna­
tive may be found to that position through 
diplomacy. 26
Perhaps the worst part of U.S. policy in regard to Berlin, 
according to Mansfield, was that it had not responded to the changes 
which had occurred in Germany and Europe since the end of World War 
Two. He told his colleagues he questioned the soundness of a policy
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which made it possible for an "error or provocation on either side" to
27cause a nuclear war. Thus, Mansfield believed that it was absolutely
crucial to find "a third way on Berlin." He believed the United States'
"present position on Berlin, even unchallenged by the Soviet Union,
leads only in a circle endlessly repeated as it continues to recede
from the changing realities of Germany and Europe until it now promises
to become at best irrelevant and at worst a stimulus to catastrophe."
And for the United States to do nothing, to maintain "the status quo"
in Berlin, would prove the "inertia of Western leadership" and "the
28sterility of our [U.S.] diplomacy."
Mansfield's third way called for both West Berlin and East Berlin
to become one free city. The Soviet Union desired West Berlin to
become a free city but not East Berlin. Mansfield proposed that all of
Berlin— East and West— become a free city. To guarantee that Berlin
would not become an issue in the Cold War, the access routes to all of
Berlin would be garrisoned by United Nations' peace-keeping forces.
This would mean that both Western and Eastern troops would leave Berlin,
starting the demilitarization of Central Europe. As previously stated
in his nine points on Berlin given before Congress in February of 1959,
Berlin's status as a free city would be guaranteed by NATO and the
Warsaw pact countries. Finally, to give the West Germans and East
Germans a point to start negotiations on for the complete unification
of Germany, "Bonn and Pankow" would be responsible to assume any
financial burdens which may come out of the arrangement as put forth 
29by Mansfield.
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As in 1959, Mansfield's speech "A Third Way On Berlin" generated
intense criticism, especially from fellow senators. There were those
who accused Mansfield of being the medium with which the Kennedy
administration could test new ideas of U.S. foreign policy and measure
30the Senate s and the public s response.
Once again Senator Jacob Javits became the chief antagonist to
Mansfield's ideas on Berlin. Javits pointed out that Mansfield, indeed,
did have great influence as the Majority Leader of the Senate and that
he was using that position to test Kennedy administration policies.
Mansfield responded in kind that Senator Javits's assertions were
unfounded. Mansfield questioned whether Javits seriously believed
that "Bonn, London, Paris or even Moscow, are so ignorant of our system
of government that they [West Germany, England, France, the USSR] do
not recognize that a Senator is first of all a Senator and has certain
obligations in that role distinct from those which he may play in the
conduct of the Senate's business." He went on to state that the
"President's prerogatives do not extend into this body." Furthermore,
Mansfield pointed out that Javits's points on Berlin should be listened
to in the United States and abroad "with just as much attention as the
31statement of the Senator from Montana or any other Senator."
Mansfield had once again to defend himself against those who 
believed he was advocating a unilateral withdrawal of Western forces 
from West Germany. This, he said, was not his intention. In fact, 
knowing this would be a strong point of criticism, he purposely stated 
in his speech on Berlin that Western troops would not leave without
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certain guarantees. He did, however, question the purpose of Western
troops in West Germany. He believed that, since a relatively small
garrison of Western troops protected the city of West Berlin against
superior numbers of the Warsaw pact troops, they were merely symbolic
of the West's intention to defend Berlin at all costs. He believed a
verbal commitment to defend Berlin was adequate for Europeans.
Mansfield stressed he did not intend to renege on this guarantee.
Mansfield contended that, in fact, he wanted to strengthen Western
32guarantees of defending all of Berlin as a free city.
To Javits, guarantees without the troops did not mean much, no
matter how sincere. According to Javits, Western troops in West
Germany would always ensure that the West would use all of its
resources to protect West Berlin and Western Europe from an invasion
33by the Soviet Union.
Unlike Senator Javits, Mansfield had little faith that Germany 
would ever be reunified "by fiat of the United States, France, Great 
Britain and Soviet Russia as was expected 15 years ago." Years of 
animosities between East and West had made it almost impossible for the 
two sides to negotiate the unification of Berlin and Germany. Also, he 
was not even sure East and West wanted to see Germany unified; the 
status quo seemed to be working, and there was no need to upset it. 
Mansfield, on the other hand, adamantly believed Germany must be 
reunited. Unlike many of his fellow colleagues, he proclaimed that 
Berlin would some day again be the capital of a unified Germany. But 
this would happen only if the entire city of Berlin could be removed
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"from the clashes of the cold war into which it has been driven by the
34events of the post-war years."
Thus, Berlin marked a clear break between Mansfield’s foreign
policy and traditional Cold War policies. He could no longer accept
the plan of militarization and maintaining the status quo as viable
plans to safeguarding peace and prosperity.
Corresponding to the Berlin crisis, the United States economy had
slipped into a recession. By 1960 there were economic signs indicating
the United States economy was on the verge of a real economic crisis.
One sign that concerned Mansfield was the amount of gold leaving the
United States Treasury due to European nations trading their huge
surplus of American dollars for gold. This outflow, Mansfield believed,
reflected "the inner weaknesses" of the U.S. economy. He recommended
that Congress and the executive branch examine the institutions which
made the country economically competitive and to see if they needed any
reforming. He looked around and saw a stagnant U.S. economy. The
production of factories and farms fell way below former levels; U.S.
education, especially science and engineering, was not competitive with
other industrial nations. How long, Mansfield wondered, could this
35decay be allowed to go on before disaster struck?
The economic crises of 1960 gave Mansfield the impetus to push for
new approaches to guarantee the Western security which would save the
United States billions of dollars. He recommended better uses for
taxpayers* money than spending billions of dollars for the protection
36of Western Europe.
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While the U.S. economy showed little growth, those of Western 
Europe grew rapidly. This did not alarm Mansfield; rather it pleased 
him immensely. He took it as a personal success because as a Repre­
sentative he had lobbied for full funding of foreign aid to Western 
Europe in order that Western Europe regain economic prosperity.
Further, he had also continuously lobbied for the economic integration 
of Western Europe and now that too had become a reality with the 
creation of a common market. During a trip to Western Europe in 1960 
Mansfield had noticed all of the signs of prosperous economics:
"copious availability of food and other consumer goods, general 
intensity of commercial and industrial activity, the dress of the 
people and the worsening of the traffic problems in the major European
t.37cities.
Now that Western Europe had recovered from economic devastation
it had also become an economic competitor to the United States.
Mansfield believed the changing economic relationship between Western
Europe and the United States dictated adjustments in U.S.-West European
relationships should be implemented. He said:
We might assume, for example, that the great economic 
progress of Western Europe might produce a steady 
development of more effective common approaches 
towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and 
towards all the issues involved in a common advance 
of freedom throughout the world. One might also 
assume the continuation and deepening of military 
cooperation under NATO, with the Europeans bearing 
an increased share of its cost in manpower and 
material, commensurate with the improvement in 
their economic situation.^
In other words, he expected West Europeans, with continued prosperity,
to provide more and more for their own security.
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At one point in 1961 Mansfield scribbled a note which questioned
the strategy behind U.S. foreign policy. First he noted that
the key question in evaluating any policy of the 
United States is to what do we think it leads? We 
ought to know, at least, what we hope to accomplish 
by any given policy. Once we have that then we can 
measure the prospect of achieving the objective in 
terms of experience, in ration of c o s t .39
The United States, he said, if prepare "to go on paying upwards (in an
ever increasing line) $40+ billion for defense and somewhere in the
neighborhood of $5 billion annually for foreign aid," the country
should "concentrate on holding the line and minimize contact with the
Soviet Union." However, he wondered, would the ever-increasing cost of
containing the Soviet Union prove unbearable for the U.S. economy?
After consideration, if the answer turned out yes, then other options
must be found for maintaining the status quo. Mansfield stated that
"If we are not satisfied to do the above [spend billions of dollars],
then we have got to seek policies which seek to preserve the present
40geographical division of power by more astute diplomacy."
As he had in 1951, Mansfield warned the Senate not to allow drift, 
stagnation, or sterility to creep into U.S. foreign policy; he implored 
the Senate to meet the foreign affairs challenges in front of it. 
Mansfield felt it necessary for the United States to decide whether 
the established policies of containment to counter Soviet expansionism 
made any sense in 1961. If they did not, debate in Congress should 
start outlining a new and more effective foreign policy.
By October 1962, with the friction between the Soviet Union and 
the United States increasing and most dramatically evident with the
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Cuban Missile Crisis, American defense spending grew greatly. Mansfield 
thought U.S. foreign policy needed changing. The issue of U.S. military 
assistance— and included in this assistance was the stationing of U.S. 
troops in Western Europe— became the issue which Mansfield would use 
to make his point in regard to U.S. foreign policy.
In 1962, with the incentives of the gold drain, the reluctance of 
Western European nations to assume more of their own security burdens, 
the postwar recovery of Western European economies, and America’s in 
Asia, Mansfield for the first time proposed ending all military 
assistance to Western Europe and the possible withdrawal of some U.S. 
ground forces in Western Europe. For Mansfield, withdrawing a number 
of U.S. troops in Western Europe presented the chance for a whole new 
phase in U.S. foreign policy, possibly one that would deescalate the 
Cold War. However, in 1962 there was little support in the United 
States for a unilateral withdrawal of any U.S. troops in Western Europe, 
and he never considered recommending the United States take such action 
in 1962. He did contend in a statement released on January 2, 1961 that 
due to the superior number of Soviet forces in Western Europe he made 
it clear that the U.S. divisions in Western Europe were purely symbolic 
and that two or three divisions could do the job as well as the six 
U.S. divisions already there. If the Soviet Union agreed to cut their 
force level proportionately to that of the United States, then the 
United States should agree to such an arrangement, for it was in the 
interests of both nations to do so. Such an agreement would reduce 
"tension in Europe." It would reduce the drain on the U.S. economy;
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it would also allow the Soviet Union to reduce their cost of defense,
which Mansfield believed they were eager to do. The West Europeans now
had the financial resources to equip and support three divisions of
their own. All in all, the mutual withdrawal of American and Soviet
troops would benefit the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe
because, according to Mansfield, it "would be a rational step towards
normalcy in Europe and peace. It would be a step benefiting all the
nations involved and reflecting the improved stability, financially and
41otherwise, of Western Europe."
Mansfield realized the fury of the Cold War throughout 1962 made
it impossible for the United States and the Soviet Union to sit down
and commence talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe.
Mansfield had little choice but to wait until the world political scene
changed for the better or until the economic circumstances of the
United States worsened. Both were right around the bend.
From 1963 to 1966, however, Mansfield served as Majority Leader of
the Senate. The assassination of John Kennedy, a surge in domestic
legislation which needed guidance through the Senate, and the start of
the Vietnam war, all kept Mansfield very busy. Many of these very
problems also convinced him that United States foreign policy needed
drastic overhauling in order to meet new demands, and the start of this
overhaul, he believed, should begin with a reduction of U.S. troops in 
42Europe.
Two events in 1966 influenced Mansfield1s decision to go ahead and 
offer a resolution which recommended the United States proceed with a
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unilateral withdrawal of two to three divisions of troops in Western
Europe. He would offer two more identical resolutions over the next
three years. First, General de Gaulle withdrawing all French forces
from NATO and then demanding that the NATO headquarters be moved to
another country had a profound impact on Mansfield’s actions. Second,
Dwight Eisenhower’s advocacy of a substantial reduction of U.S. troops
43in Western Europe probably had even a greater impact on Mansfield.
Initially in 1966 there was substantial support in the Senate for
a troop withdrawal. In fact the idea for the first resolution
surfaced in a meeting of the Democratic Policy Committee. Senator
Stuart Symington, who had just returned from a trip to Europe and was
disillusioned by the West Europeans’ attitudes toward NATO, recommended
that such a resolution be drafted. The entire committee then agreed
that something had to be done in light of the weakening economic status
44of the United States.
Realizing that a substantial number of senators might back such a 
resolution, Mansfield went ahead and tested the water. In a letter to 
President Johnson, Mansfield informed Johnson that during the Democratic 
Policy Committee meeting on July 13, 1966 "one of the members present"
45questioned the size of the U.S. military contingent in Western Europe. 
"The matter," stated Mansfield, "was brought up as it related to gold 
outflow and balance of payment difficulties." The committee had come 
up with a list of points which mandated a withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from Western Europe. The purpose of the letter was for Mansfield to 
"communicate" to President Johnson the "unanimous" judgments of the 
committee, which were:
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1. There should be a "substantial" reduction of 
U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe;
2. Unless tangible and significant steps are 
taken promptly in this direction by the 
Executive Branch, it should be anticipated 
that the Senate, by a type of resolution or 
in some other fashion, may be expected to 
try to stimulate a reduction of U.S. forces 
in Western Europe.^
Ending the letter to President Johnson, Mansfield noted that "the
expression of concern in the Committee was very pronounced, particularly
as the question of troops in Europe involved in difficulties pertaining
47to gold outflow and balance of payments." Mansfield cited eight
points in support of Resolution 300. First on his list was President
Eisenhower*s advocacy of a reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. The
Democratic Policy Committee also believed that one or two U.S.
divisions in Europe could be "as persuasive in indicating [the United
States] resolve and intentions as five divisions." Furthermore, since
European nations had not met their troop pledges to NATO, the United
States had no incentive to remain "wedded" to its commitments. And,
because the United States committed five divisions to the protection
of Western Europe "in circumstances very different from those which
prevail today," new economic and political relationships enabled the
48United States to withdraw many of its troops in Western Europe.
Shortly after the letter to President Johnson, Mansfield offered
Resolution 300, which made clear the United States would continue to
play an integral role in Western Europe’s security, the "preservation
49of liberties," and "the maintenance of world peace." However, as 
this resolution made absolutely clear, the present circumstances
55
allowed the United States to withdraw some of its troops.
Mansfield explained to his fellow colleagues that this resolution, 
if adhered to, would enhance the relationship between Western Europe 
and the United States. Western Europe, Mansfield hoped, would become 
more of a factor in world affairs. In August 1966, as in 1955 and in 
1961, Mansfield declared Western Europe had recovered from the 
devastation of World War Two. All the economic indicators proved that 
Western Europe could provide its own defense, and yet Western Europe 
appeared unwilling to meet its military commitments to NATO. In fact, 
instead of increasing their support of NATO, West European NATO 
members had demonstrated their unwillingness to support NATO fully by 
reducing their conscription periods. According to Mansfield, the only 
nation which had fulfilled its share of supporting the NATO was the 
United States. This did not make much sense to Mansfield given that 
Western European countries had a more immediate security risk than the 
United States. In response to the intransigence of Western Europe, 
Mansfield hoped Resolution 300 would "advise" the president to 
reevaluate the need for so many American divisions in Western Europe, 
if the President saw fit, to withdraw two to three divisions from 
Western Europe, thus forcing the West Europeans to.make up the loss 
of troops, or if they so chose not to do anything.^
The Johnson administration did not look favorably upon this 
resolution. In fact, during a phone conversation with Senator 
Mansfield, Johnson "disapproved" of Resolution 300. Mansfield did 
not intend to force the Johnson administration to commit itself to a
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given course. Rather, Mansfield was putting gentle pressure on the
Johnson administration and the Senate, hoping that at least a troop
withdrawal might be debated.^
In December 1966 the Senate adjourned for Christmas vacation
without debating or voting on Resolution 300. However, when the Senate
reconvened in January 1967 Mansfield resurrected Resolution 300,
changing only the number to Resolution 49. In the Senate the resolution
picked up quick support thanks to the Vietnam war and a substantial
trade imbalance between Western Europe and the United States, which
flooded West European banks with dollars. However, Mansfield conveyed
to the Senate "with or without a problem of balance of payments, with
or without the immense requirements of Vietnam, the reduction of U.S.
forces in Western Europe is justified on its own merits, as a long-
overdue adjustment in U.S. policy with respect to Europe." He told
the Senate that he "began an advocacy of this course long before we
became immersed in the conflict in Vietnam or deeply concerned with
52the question of balance of payments." Indeed, Mansfield’s advocacy
of a troop withdrawal began in 1951 when he gave his approval to the
sending of four more divisions to Western Europe based on the impression
that once economic recovery and political stability had been achieved
53in Western Europe most of the troops would be withdrawn.
In January of 1967 the Johnson administration wanted to draw as 
little attention as possible to Mansfield's resolution, for the United 
States, England, and West Germany were engaged in discussions over 
troop deployment, strategy, and arms purchases. In fact, the Johnson
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administration had hoped to persuade Mansfield to hold off on
Resolution 49. In response to the introduction of Resolution 49,
Dick Moose, an assistant to Walt Rostow, suggested that some action
should be taken "to avoid having the Resolution [49] debated and
54passed just as the Trilateral Talks are in the critical phase." One
option, according to Moose, was to "go to Mansfield . . . and ask for
time to act out a multilateral c h a r a d e . A n o t h e r  option was "a
quiet campaign to modify the Resolution and/or delay the hearings."
"Tha^s the most we can hope for," conceded Moose, for "defeat of the
56Resolution seems unlikely."
Moose misjudged Mansfield, for it was exactly this stalling and
compromising by the executive branch which infuriated Mansfield. In
part, he had reintroduced the resolution to return U.S. forces in the
hope of raising that issue during the tripartite talks. He meant to
keep the pressure on the Johnson people negotiating the future direction
of the Atlantic Alliance. To his amazement, however, the tripartite
talks produced "interim decisions on our [United States1] part to
maintain the status quo and postpone the hard decisions. It was
"ironic," noted Mansfield, "that the principal decision of the recent
tripartite Conference involves a new U.S. commitment to buy $35 million
worth or[sic] arms and services from Great Britain in order to stave
off the reduction in the British Army of the Rhine which London had
58previously announced it felt compelled to make." He could not believe 
it; it seemed as though the Johnson administration and a large segment 
of the Senate (42 Senators had co-sponsored Resolution 49) were heading
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in different directions over the issue of U.S. troops in Europe.
Continuing his talk on the recent tripartite agreement, Mansfield 
told the Senate that the security of Western Europe could not be 
secured by "a magic number of U.S. troops." American soldiers, he said, 
do not automatically "underwrite our diplomacy and insure ultimate
59solutions of Europe's problems as we think they should be solved."
In closing, Mansfield warned that for NATO to survive as an effective
system of collective defense, NATO must "reflect the changing attitudes
and preoccupations of all of its members." Previously, NATO had not
responded to the changing attitudes of individual members. However,
with frustration building within the Alliance, NATO had no choice.
Mansfield cited France's unilateral decision in 1966 to withdraw its
forces from NATO as a result of NATO's inability to meet the individual
needs of member nations and the start of a dangerous precedent.
De Gaulle's actions had sent a clear message that the Alliance needed
to make some fundamental adjustments. "In short," Mansfield said,
"this resolution calls upon those who remain shackled to an outdated
policy based on a Europe as it was yesterday to face up to the fact
that tomorrow will always seem to be a better time to take the action
60which is urgently required today."
Continuing his lobbying for Resolution 49, Mansfield explained to 
an audience at the University of North Carolina how Western European 
nations had made unilateral adjustments to NATO. De Gaulle's France 
led the way, and Mansfield wondered why the United States had not 
followed suit. In fact, "the contrasts in performance," Mansfield
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declared, between the United States and Western Europe had become an
"embarrassment." It had moved the United States away from "the
mainstream of European developments" and would eventually become "a
61source of friction on both sides."
In the same speech he explained that his calls for the withdrawal 
of four divisions of troops from Western Europe did not indicate a 
revision to an isolationist policy, as many of the opponents to a 
reduction claimed. Mansfield proclaimed general terms like
62"isolationism" or "internationalism" had "lost their pertinence."
He stated the meaning of labels, as used to describe the previous
course of U.S. foreign policy, could not be used as standard labels
today. More important than labels, to Mansfield, was that foreign
policy be "timely and adjust[ed] to the bonafide interest of the
63nation and to the realities of the contemporary world."
Mansfield closed his speech with an unusual public attack upon
the executive branch. He found it "difficult to acquiesce in
Executive Branch fears for Western Europe1s security which are
obviously far greater than the fears of the Europeans themselves."
He found a "lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have
carried our [United States1] diplomacy." Further, he found that the
United States had "begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe" to
force West Europeans to make a greater contribution to their own
defense, yet just the opposite had happened— West European NATO members
64had reduced the number of men in uniform.
Mansfield did not like to go public with his criticism of any 
presidential administration. He believed he could make more of an
60
impact on a president through back channels rather than through the 
use of the podium. However, the harshness of the speech given at North 
Carolina and its frank discussion of the need for a troop withdrawal 
clearly demonstrated that a rift had developed between Johnson and 
Mansfield over the withdrawal of American forces.
A subcommittee began hearings on Resolution 49 on April 26. In 
the meantime the Johnson administration announced that the United States 
planned to redeploy 35,000 military personnel from West Germany to the 
United States, beginning in April of 1968. The Johnson administration 
also announced that West Germany had agreed to buy 500 million dollars 
of U.S. Treasury bonds and to make public its commitment not to convert 
its dollar reserves for gold. Most senators welcomed this news, 
including Mansfield. In light of this announcement, support quickly 
dwindled for Resolution 49.
When the hearing commenced, support continued to wane as the
diverse political personalities of Democratic Senators Fulbright from
Arkansas, Church from Idaho, Symington from Missouri, Jackson from
Washington, Sparkman from Alabama, Stennis from Mississippi, and
Republican Senators Aiken from Vermont, Hickenlooper and Miller from
Iowa, and Pearson from Kansas threatened the survival of the resolution.
Indeed, it appeared unlikely that the amendment would be voted out of
65the subcommittee. Moreover, with West Germany agreeing to assume a 
large part of the costs of stationing American troops in West Germany 
and promising to redeploy 35,000 troops stationed from Western Europe, 
support for the resolution quickly dissipated. As interest subsided
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the subcommittee ceased hearing. The Johnson administration had scored 
a major victory, and Mansfield recorded just another of many defeats.
Although temporarily defused, the initiative for troop reduction 
was far from abandoned. Mansfield believed Johnson1s initiative to 
redeploy troops represented just the start of bigger and better things, 
which he hoped would culminate in a major reduction of U.S. troops from 
Western Europe.
In spite of his continued interest, the year 1968 marked a lull 
in his drive for a troop reduction. His duties as Majority Leader, the 
presidential campagin, and the Vietnam war, left Mansfield little time 
to concentrate on sponsoring another resolution to reduce American 
forces in Western Europe. Furthermore, the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by the Soviet army on August 20, 1968 made it inopportune to push for 
any resolution which advocated the reduction of U.S. forces from Western 
Europe. Mansfield realized the Senate would not debate a troop with­
drawal in the aftermath of the Soviet UnionTs actions in Eastern 
Europe. Personally, Mansfield believed NATO could not be expected to 
impede or deter the attack of one Warsaw pact nation against another; 
he therefore saw no reason not to debate the troops issue. Nevertheless, 
immediately after the invasion he stated that he would not continue to 
advocate a reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe. He made this 
statement with "resignation and sadness" because "a reduction would have 
saved American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars"; the balance 
of payment problems would have been mitigated; and a unilateral troop 
reduction would have improved the relationship between the United
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States and Western Europe. However, Mansfield had not lost hope for a 
reduction in the near future. The United States, he asserted, should 
be planning for this day to come.^
In November 1968 Richard Nixon defeated Humbert Humphrey in the 
presidential election. Mansfield decided to hold off on another 
resolution while waiting to see in what direction the Nixon administra­
tion would steer U.S. foreign policy, especially in regard to Western 
Europe. It was not long, however, that Mansfield realized the Nixon 
administration's approach to Western Europe would differ little from 
that of the Johnson administration or, for that matter, from the 
Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations. Within a matter of months, 
Mansfield dusted off his proposal to withdraw a substantial number of 
American troops from Europe and prepared to make his move once again.
Mansfield had been preparing for the end of the honeymoon. In 
fact, while the Nixon administration appraised the direction of U.S. 
foreign policy during its first months in office, Mansfield was doing 
his homework— attempting to forecast the intentions of the Nixon 
administration in regard to foreign policy. On January 22, 1969, in 
a letter to Secretary of State William Rogers, Mansfield asked what 
the Department of State intended to do in the next round of negotia­
tions on the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in West Germany. 
Apparently, even before Rogers had officially become Secretary of 
State, he had made promises at the November ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council that the United States would not withdraw 
any U.S. troops from Western Europe and had even agreed to commit more
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U.S. resources to the defense of Western Europe. Mansfield wanted to 
know what promises had been made, and if the commitment had been made 
to send extra U.S. troops and aircraft to Western Europe, Mansfield 
never received a reply from Rogers.^
After the Nixon administration's military policy in-Western
Europe became clear to him and because he believed that events in
Czechoslovakia had sufficiently died down, Mansfield decided the time
was propitious to submit his third resolution. In introducing
Resolution 292, which was identical to Resolutions 49 and 300,
Mansfield pointed out that of the 3.5 million Americans in the various
branches of the U.S. military 1.2 million were stationed overseas.
Mansfield argued that the 315,000 American troops in Western Europe
and their 235,000 dependents constituted a tremendous drain on U.S.
resources. Indeed, the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in West
Germany had created a foreign exchange gap around $965 million per
year. The United States and West Germany had agreed to ease this
foreign exchange gap by West Germany purchasing military hardware
from the United States, paying off Marshall Plan loans, and buying
U.S. Treasury bonds. Still, these remedies neither solved the exchange
68problem nor did they fully satisfy Mansfield.
Just as Mansfield believed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
had failed to respond to changing realities so, too, he thought that 
the Nixon administration was not responding properly to new develop­
ments in foreign relations. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had 
reduced the number of their troops in Czechoslovakia because of the
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problems that had arisen on the Soviet-Chinese border, and yet the
United States remained intransigent in light of these developments.
He brushed aside the relevance of the Soviet Union's invasion of
Czechoslovakia by stating the United States could not have stopped
the invasion with "one or two divisions or, for that matter, seven
or eight or 18 divisions, instead of four or five." Mansfield found
it disconcerting that within NATO itself force reductions had been
studied for "years," and yet little progress had been made toward
69coming up with a viable plan. He then remarked that both the Soviet 
Union and the United States together supported a million soldiers in 
Central Europe. To him such a situation symbolized the "anachronistic" 
nature of the two countries' policies pursued by the two countries.
He finished his talk by saying, "the age of empire, the era of 
occupation, the period of the cold war and one-sided financial 
preeminence" were past. "The persistence of these vestiges in present 
policies involves, in my judgment, a wasteful and dangerous use of 
our available fiscal resources."^
On January 23, 1970 Mansfield believed a major victory had been 
achieved. During his State of the Union address President Nixon said 
that many of the Cold War policies were in today's world unnecessary 
and obsolete and needed changing. Mansfield was ecstatic. He had 
been waiting since 1954 for a president to make such a statement.
Nixon appeared to be in agreement with Mansfield's predilections for 
a flexible, innovative approach to foreign policy. Nixon then expanded 
on what would later become known as the Nixon Doctrine. He told 
Congress:
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Neither the defense nor the development of other 
nations can be exclusively or primarily an American 
undertaking.
The nations of each part of the world should 
assume the primary responsibility for their own 
well-being; and they themselves should determine 
the terms of that well-being.
To insist that other nations play a role is not
a retreat from responsibility, but a sharing of 
responsibility.
We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments 
but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence 
in other nations1 affairs.^
With the latter statement Mansfield fully agreed.
With Mansfield1s euphoria was confusion because on January 20,
1970 Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson had given a speech 
before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations which sharply rebuked 
the merits of Resolution 292. Richardson asserted that those who 
wanted to withdraw a substantial number of U.S. forces from Western 
Europe believed NATO no longer had a valid function when in fact the 
present number of U.S. divisions in Western Europe had to be maintained 
to provide an effective flexible response. Richardson asserted that if 
a substantial number of U.S. troops were brought home no savings to the
American taxpayer would occur due to the fact the troops would have to
be stationed somewhere in the United States. Furthermore a unilateral 
withdrawal would rule out a negotiated settlement for the mutual 
withdrawal of troops from Central Europe. Finally, to allow the West 
German army to fill the void left by the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
would set a dangerous precedent, possibly creating instability in 
Europe.
On January 23 Mansfield contested all of Richardson's assertions
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before the Senate. Responding to Richardson’s main criticism that 
Resolution 292 would diminish or destroy the "strength, closeness, 
trust, realism and flexibility of NATO," Mansfield responsed Western 
Europe, with its population of 250 million and a "tremendous industrial 
base," should be able to "organize an effective military coalition to 
defend themselves against 200 million Russians." Mansfield reiterated 
that the Europeans had become so comfortable with the "status quo" that 
they had become apathetic toward their own defense "distorting the 
relationship between Europe and the United States" which resulted in 
a drain on American resources.^
While he disputed Richardson’s points Mansfield praised Nixon’s
ground-breaking and provocative State of the Union message. He
wondered which plan, Richardson’s speech or Richard Nixon’s State of
the Union address, the Nixon administration intended to follow. In
other words, he wanted to find out if the Nixon administration intended
to maintain the military status quo in Western Europe or implement the
Nixon Doctrine, which called for West European nations to share more
of the defense burden and, Mansfield hoped, allow the United States to
reduce its military presence in Western Europe. While he waited to
see which course the Nixon administration would ultimately choose,
73Mansfield decided to put Resolution 292 on hold.
It seemed to Mansfield that the Nixon administration had made a 
final decision when on November 30, 1970 Secretary of Defense Melvin 
Laird agreed that the United States would maintain U.S. troop levels 
in Western Europe for at least eighteen months. In return for this
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commitment by the United States the West European members of NATO agreed
to spend a billion dollars more for NATO. This arrangement did not
satisfy Mansfield for he considered this agreement to be another
74political palliative.
In reaction to Melvin LairdTs statement Mansfield stated that the 
NATO meeting of December 1970 was "a deep disappointment because of the 
firm pledge made by the executive branch of the U.S. government to 
maintain the present level of U.S. forces in Europe." He had hoped 
that the Nixon administration would begin "substantial reduction of 
American troops and dependents in Western Europe" starting some time 
after June 30, 1971. He had come to believe that the Nixon administra­
tion did not intend to apply the Nixon Doctrine to Western Europe. In 
the last two sentences of his statement Mansfield revealed that he no 
longer would be willing to compromise on this issue.
I intend to do all that I possibly can to try 
to bring about a substantial reduction of Ameri­
can troops and dependents in Europe. I think that 
the American people want to see such a reduction.
And I think that a majority of the U.S. Senate 
wants to see such a r e d u c t i o n . 75
This time Mansfield was not about to let stalling tactics succeed.
Mansfield figured that the Nixon administration had laid down the
gauntlet; now it was time for him to react. Fifty-two senators
co-sponsored Resolution 292 indicating to Mansfield there was strong
support in the Senate for a reduction of U.S. troops. He believed that
sincere debate not only on the potentialities of U.S. troops from
Western Europe but also on the direction of U.S. foreign policy was
desperately needed. He decided that the time had come to force the
issue.
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With his mind made up that U.S. foreign policy needed serious 
debate and hopefully adjustment, starting with the Berlin crisis in 
1959, Mansfield charged forth inspiring lively debate in the Senate 
over American foreign policy. At first his actions and recommendations 
were mild. His thoughts on Berlin inspired others to respond and think 
about new solutions to old problems. After Berlin, Mansfield turned 
his attention toward the role of American troops in Western Europe.
Once again he quietly nudged the Senate and the executive branch to 
take a close look at U.S. policy in Western Europe. However, 
increasingly Mansfield believed his mild gestures were not making an 
impact, especially on the executive branch. Finally, after all but 
being ignored by the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, 
Mansfield in 1971 decided the time was right to use heavy-handed 
tactics to bring the debate over U.S. foreign policy to the attention 
of the executive branch, the Senate, and the American people.
CHAPTER THREE
THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT
Ultimately, there was not one event but many over a seventeen-year 
period which impelled Mansfield on May 11, 1971 to attempt to legislate 
a withdrawal of 150,000 American soldiers from Western Europe by 
attaching an amendment to the Military Service Act. Certainly the 
decline in the value of the dollar resulting from the United States’ 
large deficit in trade was the immediate cause, which in part resulted 
from the United States keeping troops in Western Europe. However, in 
introducing his amendment Mansfield listed all of his reasons to 
legislate a withdrawal of 150,000 troops from Western Europe: the
West Europeans needed to commit more money and men for their own 
defense; the U.S. forces now in Western Europe merely acted as a trip­
wire and not a force which could hold its own against a Soviet Union 
conventional attack; Detente and Ostpolitik would never come about in 
the near future because the Soviet Union and the United States would 
not be able to settle their differences in a highly politicized world, 
so the United States should take the initiative toward deescalation of 
the Cold War by withdrawing some of its troops unilaterally. Finally, 
Mansfield was fed up with the stalling tactics of three presidential 
administrations on this issue. By attaching his amendment to the 
Military Service Act Mansfield had ensured that stalling on the part 
of the Nixon administration would be impossible, for the Military
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Service Act was pivotal to providing money and men for the Vietnam 
1war.
In attempting to determine what caused Mansfield to submit the
Mansfield amendment, James Reston wrote that Mansfield's actions were
mainly the accumulated frustrations of over twenty 
years. Mike is fed up with the war, with the cost 
of the military, with the failure of most of the 
European allies to hold up their end of the common 
defense burden, and with the inability of the 
Government to resolve any of these problems. . . .
The recent European run on the dollar was too much 
for him, so he reaced for his meat-ax.
Reston admitted that Mansfield's charges were "fair," but he~also said
the Senate was not about to "dismember the most effective American
alliance of the century." Reston continued that "when old policies
are not kept up to date and appeals for sensible review of force levels
are ignored, odd things can happen in Washington." Reston noted that
Mansfield had been an integral part of the generation which tried
unsuccessfully to "encourage the formation of a strong and unified
Europe which could act as an equal partner with the United States in
a shared defense of a common civilization." That had never come about,
however, and Reston knew why. "The Europeans," he wrote, "have
preferred to enjoy their prosperity and national independence rather
than pay the price of political union, and have counted on the United
2States for their security rather than on one another."
In defense of Mansfield Reston commented that Mansfield was not 
an "ill-tempered isolationist acting out of frustration and caprice." 
Rather, Mansfield's point was to force a reappraisal of policy in 
Europe. Reston noted that since Mansfield had been around
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Washington, D.C. long enough to know "institutions don’t move unless
3they are shoved," Mansfield meant to move them.
In closing his article Reston wondered whether Mansfield’s "gentle 
meat ax" might "do some good after all." It might "even revive some 
talk about building a sensible world order again, and no such large 
subject as that has been discussed around here since Lyndon Johson
4discovered Vietnam."
To the Nixon administration the introduction of the Mansfield 
amendment symbolized the start of a Vietnamization process in Western 
Europe, which the Nixon administration wished to quash. Mansfield 
hoped the Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine would be applied to Western 
Europe; however, the Nixon administration never intended this course 
of action. In fact, all of the reports Nixon’s National Security 
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, received indicated that U.S. conventional 
forces in Western Europe needed to be "enhanced, not reduced. 
Furthermore, the Nixon administration believed that any amendment 
touching on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would infringe 
on the President’s powers over foreign policy. Senator Hugh Scott, 
a supporter of the Nixon administration's position, let it be known 
in the Senate that the Nixon administration would "not accept any 
alternative that would have the effect of Congress determining the 
foreign policy of the United States toward NATO." And the White 
House spokesman, Ronald Ziegler, asked if the administration would 
accept any compromises, Ziegler replied, "Absolutely not."^
The introduction of the Mansfield amendment caught the Nixon 
administration off guard. They realized the challenge presented to
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the administration's power of formulating U.S. foreign policy and 
quickly organized an array of weapons to ensure the defeat of the 
amendment. President Nixon assigned Henry Kissinger the job of 
stopping the passage of amendment 6531.
Kissinger, too, perceived this amendment as a battle over the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy. In short, in Kissinger's and Nixon's 
minds this was an attack by the "liberal Establishment" upon the Nixon 
administration. This liberal Establishment according to Kissinger had 
"throughout the century . . . extolled the importance of a strong 
Executive, and reversed itself and had pressed on the Congress its 
obligation to control tightly an allegedly power mad and war obsessed
g
Administration."
In part Kissinger was correct. The Mansfield amendment was a 
check on what Mansfield believed had become during the Cold War 
unchecked powers of the executive branch in foreign affairs. But 
Kissinger had assumed too much by equating the Mansfield amendment 
with an attack by what Kissinger ambiguously termed the "liberal 
Establishment." Instead, Kissinger proclaimed that Mansfield's 
amendment derived from a man who was "at heart . . .  an isolationist." 
According to Kissinger the amendment grew out of a "coalition of 
frustration" on the part of Mansfield, "not based upon an adequate
9understanding and rational approach to the world as it stood in 1971."
Simply, Mansfield and Kissinger approached foreign affairs from 
different perspectives. Indeed, Mansfield and Kissinger, the figure­
heads of the two opposing sides over the Mansfield amendment, could
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not have been more different in their approach to the implementation of 
foreign policy. Kissinger eagerly accepted the assignment to ensure 
the defeat of the Mansfield amendment because he believed a reduction 
of U.S. forces in Western Europe "would shake the very foundation of 
our postwar policy."^ That was exactly what Mansfield had in mind.
To Mansfield a defunct, archaic foreign policy should have its 
foundations shaken.
Although not a frontal assault on the powers of the Nixon admin­
istration— as Kissinger and Nixon believed— and not a threat to the 
constitutional prerogatives of the presidency, Mansfield clearly 
intended to put the Nixon administration to the test. Mansfield wished 
to set the record straight as to the direction of U.S. foreign policy. 
Throughout its first three years in office the Nixon administration 
had sent out conflicting signals in regard to the direction of U.S. 
foreign policy. The Nixon Doctrine or Guam Doctrine, which proclaimed 
that the United States would no longer act as the world police force, 
had been instituted only in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Mansfield 
concluded that the United States was still playing the role as the 
world’s policeman, which he appraised was contrary to the Guam Doctrine 
in its broadest interpretation. In fact since Nixon formally declared 
the Nixon Doctrine in January of 1971, various members of the Nixon 
cabinet had declared that the United States would not only maintain 
its role in world affairs through the auspices of the U.S. military 
but would increase that role by committing more U.S. forces overseas. 
Mansfield simply wanted to set the record straight. Which would it be?
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Did the Nixon administration intend to reduce U.S. troops overseas, or 
did it intend to keep the current level of troops overseas and possibly 
even increase those levels?
In the Senate, John Stennis from Mississippi took charge of the 
opposition to the Mansfield amendment. Since Stennis, too, was caught 
off guard by the introduction of the Mansfield amendment, his immediate
goal was to stall the vote on H.R. 6531, allowing the opposition to the
Mansfield amendment to organize and build support. Stennis argued that 
since the Mansfield amendment dealt with an issue of such importance as 
the security of Western Europe and the United States, ample debate 
should be allowed. Mansfield agreed to a weekTs worth of debate on
H.R. 6531 before bringing the amendment to a vote.^
In response to Mansfield’s amendment, Stennis indicated that he 
too would like to see an eventual reduction in U.S. troops "with more 
emphasis on quality rather than numbers," but, he believed, a reduction 
of U.S. troops at that time would send a sign to the Soviet Union that 
the United States in effect was abandoning Western Europe. That would 
destroy any hope for mutual reduction of troops in Europe. Stennis 
proposed that troop reduction should be mutual and proportional. A 
"meat ax approach," he said, did not constitute "sound policy." He 
agreed with Mansfield that West Europeans should do more for their own 
defense, but withdrawing 150,000 American troops would not work.
Rather it would send a clear signal to West European members of NATO 
that the United States was no longer fully committed to Western 
security. The commitment of so many U.S. troops, according to Stennis,
75
gave West Europeans and especially West Germans a "great source of
satisfaction and inspiration and encouragement to them so that they
will not submit to blackmail and not go over to the other side and not
give up." Stennis admitted that the Soviet-U.S. relationship had
improved in the last year, but he warned the residues of the
Czechoslovakia invasion were still being felt. Furthermore, Stennis
argued that the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from Western
Europe would save the United States very little money because the
troops would be stationed in the United States. As far as the balance-
of-payment problems, U.S. forces in Western Europe were only one of
many contributors to this problem. American industry investing heavily
in Western Europe and American tourists spending billions of dollars
vacationing in Western Europe, argued Stennis, contributed dramatically
12to the balance-of-payment problems.
Following Stennis, Senator Dominick of Colorado, a one-time 
supporter of Mansfield*s resolutions, argued against H.R. 6531 as it 
stood because it was unconstitutional. Dominick stated it "substi­
tute [d] the judgment of the Senate for the judgment of the President 
of the United States." Only the president of the United States should
determine "what force levels need[ed] to be in what places in order to
13assure the defense of the American people." Essentially, the 
arguments of Mansfield, Stennis, and Dominick for and against the 
amendment outlined the issues of the debate which would take place 
over the next five days in the Senate.
During the second day of debate on the Mansfield amendment certain
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members of the Nixon administration, the press, and various scholars 
brushed aside the Mansfield amendment as a piece of legislation 
constructed by an isolationist or neo-isolationist. Both sides 
believed the vote would be close. During the initial stages of debate, 
each side did a rough survey of how the Senate would vote if the bill 
were brought to a vote immediately. Certainly the United States' 
financial situation and the start of Detente convinced many senators 
that the time was ripe for a more limited role by the United States 
in Western Europe; however, much of the initial support for the 
Mansfield amendment in the Senate grew out of Mansfield's reputation
14for integrity, prudence and knowledge, especially in foreign affairs.
As James Reston wrote, Mansfield epitomized "a cool and sensible man, 
so when he tries to cut the American military forces in Europe in two 
it is obvious that something is w r o n g . T h u s ,  those against the 
Mansfield amendment had to fight more than the merits of the amendment. 
They had to contend with Mansfield's achievements as a senator and 
with his expertise on foreign affairs.
To help combat Mansfield's reputation as a skilled statesman, the 
Nixon administration enlisted the support of men with reputations 
equal to that of Mansfield. Kissinger decided to mobilize the "old 
establishment." Brought together to influence uncommitted senators 
were Dean Acheson (Secretary of State in the Truman administration), 
John McCloy and Lucius Clay (former High Commissioners in Germany), 
George Ball and Nicholas Katzenbach (both former Under Secretary of 
State), Henry Cabot Lodge (former Ambassador to the United Nations), 
Cyrus Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense and future Secretary
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of State in the Carter administration), Alfred Gruenter, Lauris 
Norstad, and Lyman Lemnitzer (all former Supreme Allied Commanders 
in Europe).
The group compiled a Who’s Who of the Old Guard— men who were
all "present at the creation." The chief creator himself, Dean
Acheson, acted as the group’s spokesman. After meeting with Nixon
and Kissinger, the group met with the press. Acheson said it would
be "assinine" and "sheer nonsense" to cut forces without a cut in 
16Soviet forces. John McCloy commented it was "difficult to think
of any single piece of legislation which embodies so many potentially
disastrous consequences at this particular stage of history as this
amendment to the draft act."^ Mansfield took all this in stride.
Upon hearing about this list of notables he commented: "They are
calling in all the old-timers, all the guys who formulated this policy
1825 years ago. It just illustrates the generation gap in our policy."
During the second day of debate, Mansfield exclaimed he pursued 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Western Europe as a realist. The 
United States had to "face up to the realities of today and tomorrow," 
he said, "and update policies which may have been good 20 or 25 years 
ago." He contended that the United States would continue and should 
continue to be involved in world affairs; however, the United States 
could not be expected to expend its own resources for the welfare of 
all nations as it had so limitlessly done in the past. Limited 
resources meant that the United States could not be by itself the
19"world’s policeman"; it could not patrol "all the parts of the world."
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The United States had "neither the manpower nor the resources to stay
on the course which we have pursued so assiduously since the end of
the Second World War. It is about time that we awaken to the realities
of today. It is long past the time when we should have loosened the
20shackles of the past, Mansfield declared to his fellow senators.
Senator Gravel of Alaska supported Mansfield's latter argument.
He stressed the importance of maintaining economic "resiliency" and
"viability" of the United States for maintaining the defense and
security of the United States. The senator from Alaska believed the
security of the United States must be protected not only for the short
term but for the long term. Economic stability would give the United
States the "capacity to defend [itself] . . . not only today but in
the future as well." He asked whether the United States would be
defeating itself if it maintained a policy of defense that wasted U.S.
resources in Western Europe in the short term while jeopardizing the
long term. Gravel drew an analogy to the Civil War. The South had been
known for its "able and trained leadership," leaving many to believe
at the time that the North would be immediately overwhelmed by the
military excellence of the average Confederate soldier. The North,
on the other hand, had problems finding men to lead the Union army.
But the North still overwhelmed and completely destroyed the South due
21to its "economic and long-term productive ability."
Although Mansfield and his opponents were so far apart, so com­
pletely different in their views on what the U.S. role should be in 
world affairs, their reasoning for waging the battle could not have
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been more similar. Each side viewed the opposition1s views as
backwards, out of touch with current events, and dangerous to the
United States1 security. Each side declared that one had only to
look to the past follies of U.S. policies to know just what the
consequences of the opposing side had in store. If the Senate passed
this amendment, Kissinger, Stennis, and Dominick believed, the United
States would be reverting back to isolationism, closely resembling
that of the 1920s and 1930s, which allowed the rise of Hitler.
Mansfield responded that the Cold War foreign policy of the United
States had served a useful purpose at one time. However, the problems
with Cold War foreign policy, as Mansfield saw it, were innate: they
had a very specific goal— containment of the Soviet Union. Obsessed
with the Cold War, the statesmen who formulated and institutionalized
Cold War policies had never realized the need to include some sort of
mechanism that would allow these policies to react and change with
world events. As for the charges of isolationism, Mansfield stated,
"Nobody can be an isolationist any more." He continued,
May I say to my colleagues that the days of 
isolationism are gone and gone forever, because 
the world is too small and is still shrinking.
Means of communication and transportation are
speeding up day by day, week by week, month by 
month, and year by year. We are going to live 
with our neighbors on this whether we like it 
or not because we have no other choice. And 
even if one wanted to become an isolationist—  
and I do not— one could not do s o . 22
Many senators who had supported Mansfield’s resolutions could hot 
support the Mansfield amendment because they believed a mutual withdrawal 
of troops in Europe by both of the protagonists of the Cold War was
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possible. Mansfield had given up on the idea of the Soviet Union and
the United States agreeing to a mutual withdrawal of their troops from
Central Europe. He did not believe that the past negotiations for
mutual troop withdrawals had been done with serious intent. Rather,
Mansfield considered the talks for mutual force reductions by the
Johnson administration more as an effective palliative, designed to
combat any support Mansfield gained for his resolutions in the late 
231960s. Mansfield viewed the Soviet Union in a different context than 
many of his colleagues. In 1971 he did not consider the Soviet Union 
as the primary threat to Western security. Thus, Mansfield refused to 
accept the long-term implications of the status quo— a militarized, 
partitioned Germany and Europe— as reasonable. Instead he considered 
such an arrangement precarious and threatening to world peace.
Also, Mansfield believed that many statesmen in the United States, 
in Western Europe, and in the Soviet Union had come to regard American 
and Soviet troops as a permanent fixture in Central Europe. Mansfield 
found such a proposition unacceptable. He feared these troops would 
become security blankets, creating the false impression that without a
large contingent of U.S. troops in Western Europe peace could not
• -  24 exist.
Thus, Mansfield did not worry that his amendment might destroy
negotiations for a mutual withdrawal for in his mind the Soviet Union
and the United States were more interested in keeping their troops
25in Central Europe. In fact Mansfield believed negotiations for 
mutual force reductions had lost all credibility. Therefore, he did
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not expect the Nixon administration to be able to use the hope of mutual
reductions as an effective weapon in combating his amendment. What
Mansfield never expected was that Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Premier,
would make the hope of mutual withdrawal again a factor in the debate.
On May 14 Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union stood ready to make
reductions in their conventional forces in Central Europe if the United
States would be willing to do the same. Brezhnev had made a similar
statement on March 31, 1971 without creating much fanfare. Immediately
the White House used Mr. Brezhnev's speech as ammunition to help defeat
the Mansfield amendment. In light of Brezhnev's speech, support in the
26Senate once again grew for mutual force reduction talks.
Because the Soviet Union provides little information which might 
explain Brezhnev's actions, it is hard to determine why Brezhnev showed 
renewed interest for mutual force reduction at the critical junction of 
debate in the Senate over the Mansfield amendment. Western sources 
will have to do for now. Henry Kissinger theorized that the Soviet 
Union, engaged in Ostpolitick negotiations, stuck to its plan of giving 
the impression that it was ready to "unlock the doors to a hopeful 
future." To Kissinger, the Soviet Union's actions illustrated "the 
inflexibility of the Soviets' cumbersome policymaking machinery . . . 
to stick to their game plan even when confronted with the Mansfield 
windfall.̂
Phil Williams, author of The U.S. Senate and U.S. Troops In 
Europe, on the other hand, found Kissinger's reasoning too simplistic. 
Offering a different reason for Brezhnev's actions, Williams stated
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that "it is equally plausible that Brezhnev not only had a clear notion
of what was happening in Washington, but was sensitive to the possible
consequences, and that far from providing opportunitico to be
exploited, the amendment posed problems to be preempted." "The status
quo in Europe," continued Williams, "had many advantages for the
Soviet union, and a substantial presence of American troops was an
integral feature of the status quo." Williams asserted that the
Soviet Union was equally if not more concerned with the possible rise
in the strength of West Germany’s military power in the face of a U.S.
withdrawal. "To put it crudely," said Williams, "US troops in Europe
28helped contain West Germany as well as the Soviet Union."
Whatever Brezhnev’s reasons, his statement instantly diminished 
support in the Senate for the Mansfield amendment. It made the amend­
ment appear ill-timed. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the Republican 
senator from Maine, probably spoke for a significant number of her 
colleagues in the Senate when she argued that although Mansfield was
right in principle, the timing of his amendment could not have been
29more unfortunate. Or, from another perspective, Brezhnev’s speech 
could not have been more opportune, especially for the Nixon 
administration.
Not scorning "the enthusiasm which [had] suddenly been kindled 
for the negotiation of mutual troop reductions between the Warsaw Pact 
and NATO countries," Mansfield did point out to his colleagues that 
ten years ago he had made a similar proposal without much fanfare. 
Mansfield praised President Nixon's "affirmative" response to Brezhnev’s
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proposal; however, Mansfield reiterated his belief that the United
States should withdraw 150,000 troops regardless of what the Soviet
Union said or did. Failure to do so would disregard the obsolescent
nature of the deployment of U.S. troops in Western Europe. Moreover,
delaying such action "resulted in a debilitating drain on the resources
30of this Nation and this Nation alone."
On the last day of debate Mansfield made an impassioned speech to 
convince his colelagues that the times demanded a change in U.S. foreign 
policy. He said that it often took "a sledge hammer to make an imprint," 
and he had hoped to do just that by putting forth the Mansfield amend­
ment. The Senate needed a shock, according to Mansfield, because for 
eleven years he had been raising the troop withdrawal issue without any 
serious debate or action taking place on this issue. Mansfield 
declared that with the debate over this issue he had achieved the 
"minimum" of what he had set out to do. Also, the issue of troop 
withdrawal had been made loud and clear to the Nixon administration and 
to the members of NATO, but he was disappointed that there had been "no 
hint of an understanding from downtown or from overseas." Mansfield 
then continued by explaining what he had hoped to accomplish with the 
Mansfield amendment. By offering this amendment he had hoped to "move, 
from the past into the present, and to look to the future. What I have 
tried to do is not to look over my shoulder in order to hang on to 
policies which were good two decades ago, and think that, despite the 
changing world, those policies are just as good and just." "To be 
sure," he said, "what was done in the past was relevant and productive,"
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but he was absolutely certain that the time had come for the United
States to free itself "from certain shackles" which had originally
bound the United States "to policies and positions that [had since]
lost their meaning." He hoped that the change he proposed would set
the stage for a new relationship between Western Europe and the United
States. Mansfield argued that change should not be feared but welcomed.
A new foreign policy would strengthen the United States by freeing the
U.S. "from certain shackles" which have bound the United States to
31policies and positions that had long lost their meaning. Thus, 
searching beyond the economic implications of U.S. troops in Western 
Europe, or the war in Vietnam, or even whether the president or Congress 
should decide foreign policy, Mansfield believed that a withdrawal of 
150,000 U.S. troops from Western Europe would fundamentally change the 
United States’ role in the world in a way that reflected contemporary 
world events.
In his final speech he brought up the point that as a Representa­
tive taking part, an admittedly small part, in the formation of Cold 
War policies, he clearly remembered supporting the decision by the 
Truman administration to increase the number of American divisions in 
Western Europe. He also recalled that he expected the American 
divisions to remain for "not very long; a few years." But at present, 
in the spring of 1971, Mansfield asserted that the United States faced
"not only the possibility of an indeterminate stay of 525,000 U.S.
32military personnel and dependents, but maybe a permanent stay."
To further convince his doubters that his actions did not grow out 
of isolationism, he asserted that he did not want to return to the
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"’good old days.™ Instead realism was his goal. Indeed, the United
States had to maintain, in order for stability to continue, a role in
the world. Mansfield wanted the United States "to face up to the
responsibilities" which were the United States’, "individually and 
33collectively.”
According to Mansfield a reduction of half of the United States’
forces in Western Europe would trim U.S. troop levels in Western
Europe to "a contemporary perspective." Unlike 1951 Mansfield indicated
if West Europeans felt that the withdrawal of 150,000 troops from
Western Europe created a significant security problem, then they could
fill the gap with their own men and material.
Further, Mansfield stressed the point that the United States
foreign policy no longer reacted to the concept of a monolithic
communist bloc. In fact, China and Russia presented "the greatest
threat to each other's security." These significant changes, according
to Mansfield, had reduced the threats to world peace, Western Europe’s
security, and the security of the United States; and he wondered why
the NATO forces levels remained the same as those twenty years before
34when there had been a real risk.
He wanted "the European pocketbook to determine" how eagerly the 
Europeans desired the presence of 300,000 American servicemen and 
their 225,000 dependents. After observing the attempts by the Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Nixon administrations to get West European members of NATO 
to share a larger burden of their own defense, Mansfield believed 
burden sharing a "pious hope." Mansfield’s pessimism on these issues
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was much stronger than many if not most of his colleagues.
Many proposals to implement a withdrawal of troops had surfaced 
during the debate over the Mansfield amendment, which indicated to 
Mansfield that many senators worried about U.S. policy in Western 
Europe. However, Mansfield noted that most of their proposals that 
had come out of this debate "asked for consultations and negotiations," 
which to Mansfield was a dead-end street for the time to negotiate had 
passed. Many new opportunities would be opened up through the uni­
lateral withdrawal of 150,000 troops from Western Europe. Perhaps the 
most significant effect of a unilateral troop withdrawal by the United 
States would be the Soviet Union following the United States’ lead.
After all, Mansfield pointed out, "Moscow [had] a very great incentive 
indeed to reduce its Warsaw Pact forces and redeploy them eastward"
(a reference to the Sino-Soviet confrontation which had erupted in 
1969). He further believed a unilateral cut by the United States would 
have the same result as mutual reduction because eventually "Russia 
would be hard put to explain why it was necessary to retain such large 
forces to protect the satellites against a pruned-back NATO." As for 
the Soviets1 fears of the emergence of a militarily stronger West 
Germany, Mansfield responded the Soviet Union need not worry. Mansfield 
believed "Bonn [had] no financial stomach for substantial military 
enlargement," and such thoughts "denied the growing preeminence of
West Germany in the Common Market and its desire to retain its strong
35ties to the West and its eagerness for ties with the East."
Continuing his speech, Mansfield hinted that political instability
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in Eastern Europe motivated Brezhnev’s proposals to start negotiations
for mutual withdrawal of troops. Referring to Brezhnev's willingness
to discuss a reduction of troops in Europe Mansfield suggested that
"a Soviet leader this past weekend, worried about the prospect [of]
satellite pressure . . . might well have sought to defer any action
on United States troops strength by railing for long, drawn-out
negotiations." Once again, Mansfield questioned the sincerity of
36both the East and West to work for a troop withdrawal.
Mansfield reiterated that he did not "seek the end of NATO." Nor
would his amendment "compel the complete withdrawal of the United
States from Europe." However, he did hope that through the adoption
of his amendment U.S. foreign policy would be changed in order to meet
the demands of an ever-changing world. As things stood, U.S. foreign
policy made to meet the demands of another time no longer served a
purpose. Mansfield warned that if adjustments in U.S. foreign policy
were not made then the "vital— along with the superfluous, the
antiquated, the irrelevant, and the redundant" could be lost. Mansfield
reminded his colleagues of the circumstances which caused the United
States to send troops over to Western Europe. He then asked them
whether the same threats that created the need for six divisions in
37Western Europe still existed today.
In closing, he told his colleagues that he would not cajole or 
pressure them into voting for this amendment. He wanted his amendment 
to win on its merits or, for that fact, lose on its deficiencies. He 
believed that each senator should make up his own mind on this issue
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and not be pressured by outside forces by voting one way or the other.
But he did warn that if change did not come soon "as far as the Senate
is concerned, nobody is going to take us to the cleaners. If we are
taken in, we will be taken in by ourselves. We will have nobody to
38blame but ourselves. And, if we are, it will be too bad."
On May 19, 1971 the Senate voted down the Mansfield amendment 36 
to 61.
CONCLUSION
For a man known around Washington as being reticent and who 
effectively worked behind the scenes to get the job done, Mansfield’s 
attempt to force the withdrawal of 150,000 troops in Western Europe 
by amending the Military Service Act appeared out of character.
However, James Reston accurately pointed out that Mansfield’s actions 
resulted from years of frustration regarding U.S. foreign policy. 
According to some scholars, Mansfield’s frustrations over the direction 
of the foreign policy of the United States grew out of his unabashed 
isolationism. While not an isolationist, he did make a distinction 
between U.S. participation in world affairs and U.S. interference in 
the business of other nations. He became frustrated as he repeatedly 
failed to impress the difference on the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 
administrations and Congress. Mansfield spent much of his time as 
senator attempting to persuade those responsible for foreign policy 
to make some fundamental adjustments to U.S. foreign policy, which 
would allow more nations to play a larger role in world affairs and 
hopefully make the world a safer place.
From 1946 to 1952 Mansfield supported in Congress all U.S. foreign
policy plans devised by the Truman administration, which Mansfield 
believed would guarantee world peace and prosperity. Thus, he voted 
for the military and economic aid packages to Greece and Turkey, the
Marshall Plan, the Mutual Defense Act, the decision to send four
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divisions of U.S. troops to Western Europe, and the Point Four Plan. 
Mansfield's participation in the debates in Congress over the latter 
programs clearly revealed Mansfield's view that Western Europe held 
the key to Western security and, ultimately, to peace and prosperity.
In 1953, Mansfield proudly recognized that Western Europe had 
largely recovered from the physical devastation of World War Two and 
had returned to its role as a player in world affairs. Although 
content with Western Europe's recovery, Mansfield believed the process 
of a new Western Europe had just begun. At first he patiently waited 
for Western Europe to become a third force in world affairs— a power 
equal to that of the United States and the Soviet Union. For Western 
Europe to become such a power, Mansfield recognized that Western Europe 
must form into an economic, political and defensive union. Through 
such an arrangement, Mansfield believed, stability in the world would 
be more secure because Western Europe might help diffuse the Cold War. 
When West Europeans stalled, when they argued over semantics on how 
integration should take place seemingly, at times, putting the whole 
process on hold, Mansfield's patience turned into frustration. In 
part the Mansfield amendment grew out of these frustrations.
Mansfield also took into account the United States' culpability 
in Western Europe's lackadaisical approach to integration. In 1953 
he started to worry that those policies which had so efficiently 
guaranteed world order in the immediate postwar period were contributing 
to Western Europe's unenthusiastic posture toward union. For instance, 
the success of the Marshall Plan resulted because it had the realistic
91
goal of rehabilitating Western Europe. Mansfield supported such an 
approach to the granting of U.S. foreign aid not only to Western 
Europe, but around the globe. As a congressman he gave the impression 
that it was not in the United States* economic or security interest to 
aid a country without the goal that that country become economically 
self-sufficient. On the other hand, Mansfield had little patience for 
the misappropriation of American aid. In 1953, as a freshman senator 
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mansfield started to 
criticize the United States* policy of aiding countries which had 
limited strategic value to the United States, which were politically 
repressive and economically stagnant. Furthermore, the final outcome 
of such policies, Mansfield believed, created more enemies for the 
United States than friends.
By the time he entered the Senate Mansfield had become convinced 
that U.S. foreign policy was becoming a hazard, in part, due to the 
manner in which the United States granted military and economic aid. 
Thus, because Western Europe had by 1953 adequately recovered econ­
omically and could for the most part maintain its own defense, 
Mansfield singled out the continuance of military and economic aid 
to Western Europe as the prime symbol of the United States* backward 
approach to foreign policy. Indeed, from 1953 to his retirement from 
the Senate, Mansfield could not understand the continuation of such 
policies in Western Europe or around the world. The giving or selling 
of arms throughout the world, sending military aid to countries which 
were politically repressive, maintaining 300,000 U.S. soldiers in
92
Western Europe, continuing what appeared to be a never-ending arms 
race, he argued, failed to guarantee world peace either for the 
immediate future or for the long term* He proposed that other ways 
be found to secure Western security and peace for the long term.
Starting in 1962 Mansfield tried to initiate a debate on the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy, with the hope of changing the 
approach to U.S. foreign policy. However, he met one stumbling block 
after another in his pursuit to see serious debate commence on the 
direction of United States foreign policy. Furthermore, as the 
intransigency of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations 
became apparent to Mansfield, he responded by raising the stakes.
Without a doubt, Mansfield had made his biggest push to spur 
debate on U.S. foreign policy with the introduction of the Mansfield 
amendment. With the United States* economy in a downturn, the burdens 
of the Vietnam war, and a growing rift between the Soviet Union and 
China, Mansfield believed the time was propitious for him to make his 
move. He did so by introducing the Mansfield amendment on May 11,
1971.
As he had hoped, the amendment initiated intense debate on the 
effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy. One author had even speculated 
that Mansfield may have not wanted his amendment to be passed by the 
Senate; rather, he considered the introduction as more significant 
than its ultimate fate.^ Nonetheless, although he stated he had scored 
a slight victory just by initiating debate in the Senate over the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy, the Senate voted down his amendment,
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sending a clear sign to him that change would not be forthcoming in 
the near future. It appeared all his years of working to bring about 
change had come to naught. In fact, in his remaining five years in 
the Senate he would never again push for a withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from Western Europe. After the defeat of his amendment he essentially 
admitted that he had lost the battle. But the war was not over.
On April 7, 1975, just over a year before his retirement from
the Senate, Mansfield reiterated his belief that the Cold War policies
which had dominated the foreign policy of the United States for almost
thirty years had become anachronistic. Surveying the United States1
intervention in Vietnam, Cambodia, parts of Latin America, and the
presence of a substantial number of U.S. troops in Western Europe,
Mansfield stated such situations were "the result of a foreign policy
inaugurated six Presidents ago and carried on down to the present are
now at our doorstep." He once again argued that America’s foreign
policy needed to be updated because such a revision would be not only
in the interest of the United States, but also of the world. "It is
time," Mansfield said, "that we base our foreign policy on the present
rather than on the past, that we review and revise our defense
arrangements all over the world, and that we do so in both areas on
the basis of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches
of government." He closed his speech by saying, "We can no longer live
in the past, but must face up to the present and plan for the future."
Throughout his career in Congress, Mansfield made a valiant effort to
bring America’s foreign policy out of the past, into the present, while
2planning for the future.
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